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"Do You REALLY NEED MY SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER?"
DATA COLLECTION PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE
Jonathan J. Darrow' & Stephen D. Lichtenstein2
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him
And makes me poor indeed.
I. INTRODUCTION
Today, in both the traditional and e-commerce digital
environments, an individual's social security number is obtained as
a matter of course in order to uniquely identify both the individual
and his or her account. Whether one is seeking dental care,
obtaining a parking permit, securing an apartment, or simply
renting a video, the service-providing entity will frequently obtain
a social security number as a prerequisite to doing business. Until
recently, there were virtually no laws restricting the ability of
entities unrelated to the Social Security Administration to request,
use, collect, or handle the number. At times the government even
promoted or required its expanded use.4 This haphazard, laissez-
faire approach to the social security number has evolved into a data
collection practice that spans the gamut of organizations, from
government agencies to non-profits, employers to financial
services institutions, universities to health service providers, as
well as credit card companies, retailers, and many others.' Aptly
1 Assistant Professor of Business Law, Plymouth State University; Harvard
University (LL.M. candidate 2009), Duke University (J.D.), Boston College
(M.B.A.), Cornell University (B.S.)
2 Chair and Professor of Law, Department of Law, Taxation and Financial
Planning, Bentley University (Waltham, MA)
3 William Shakespeare, Othello, act III, sc. 3.
4 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 405(c)(2)(D)(i)(I) (2006) (authorizing the use of the
social security number for the purpose of identifying blood donors).
5 While the focus of this article is the social security number, data collection
practices that potentially disperse an individual's information across the globe
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characterizing the current state of affairs, one legal scholar noted
that "[a] person cannot function normally in today's United States
without a social security number."' Even the government has
conceded that the disclosure of a social security number is a virtual
necessity to engage in a wide range of everyday activities in
modern society, including obtaining a job.' One commentator
summed it up nicely: "If you are at all an active participant in the
modern economy, the list of companies that have your [Social
Security Number] is depressingly long."'
It was not always so. To the contrary, the widespread purposes
for which social security numbers are now used vastly exceed the
original intent of the number as simply a means for administering
the social security system.9  Enacted in 1935, the animating
purpose of the Social Security Act was:
[t]o provide for the general welfare by establishing a system of Federal
old-age benefits, and by enabling the several States to make more
adequate provision for aged persons, blind persons, dependent and
crippled children, maternal and child welfare, public health, and the
administration of their unemployment compensation laws; to establish
a Social Security Board; to raise revenue; and for other purposes.'o
are by no means limited to this number. Other key pieces of unchangeable
personal information frequently collected include names, dates of birth,
mother's maiden names, driver's license numbers, and any other personal
information the organization believes relevant. Many of the principles
articulated herein are equally applicable to these other data. See infra Part III.B.
6 Ira Bloom, Freedom of Information Laws in the Digital Age: The Death
Knell ofInformation Privacy, 12 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 9, 46 (2006).
7 Kathleen S. Swendiman, The Social Security Number: Legal Developments
Affecting Its Collection, Disclosure, and Confidentiality, CRS REPORT FOR
CONGRESS, Feb. 21, 2008, at 3, available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
RL30318.pdf [hereinafter CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS] ("[I]t would be very
difficult to work or engage in many activities in this country without a SSN.").
8 Mike Krause, Social Security Numbers: Original Intent or Identity Theft?,
INDEPENDENCE INSTITUTE, Dec. 22, 2006, http://www.i2i.org/main/article.php
?article id=1346.
9Social Security Numbers: Private Sector Entities Frequently Obtain and Use
SSNs, and Laws Limit the Disclosure of This Information, GAO REPORT 04-11,
Jan. 2004, at 8, available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0411 .pdf.
1o Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935).
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The Social Security Act was never intended to create a national
identification system for general usage." It was not until eight
years after its passage, in 1943, that President Roosevelt
inaugurated an era of expanding use of the social security number
by authorizing other federal agencies to use these numbers
whenever the agency head deemed it advisable.12 Even so, federal
use of the social security number did not substantially accelerate
until the 1960s, when the Internal Revenue Service, Veterans
Administration, and other federal agencies began using it as the
official record-keeping number." Despite increasing use of the
number, social security cards continued to warn against use for
identification purposes. From 1946 until 1972 social security cards
bore the cautionary legend "NOT FOR IDENTIFICATION."l4
This language did little to alter behavior, however, and eventually
the legend was removed."
The use of social security numbers by entities other than the
Social Security Administration is not inherently objectionable, and
social security numbers are in many ways ideally suited as unique
identifiers. The numbers themselves are essentially arbitrary 6 and
thus essentially impossible to guess or calculate. Because no two
people possess the same number, 7 the potential confusion that
might occur if names were used in their place can be avoided.
" See Steven Levy & Brad Stone, Grand Theft Identity, NEWSWEEK, July 4,
2005, available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/50433 (quoting Rep. E. Clay
Shaw Jr.).
12 Exec. Order No. 9397, 8 Fed. Reg. 16095 (Nov. 30, 1943).
'3 CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, supra note 7, at 18.
14 History, SOCIAL SECURITY ONLINE, http://www.ssa.gov/history/hfaq.html
(last visited May 29, 2008).
15 CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, supra note 7, at 5.
16 History, SOCIAL SECURITY ONLINE, supra note 14. The first three digits of
an individual's social security number are based on the geographic region of
residence at the time the number was assigned. The remaining digits "are more
or less randomly assigned." Id.
17 Social security numbers are not reused even after a holder's death. History,
SOCIAL SECURITY ONLINE, supra note 14. However, sometimes more than one
person may use a social security number either on purpose, as in the case of
identity theft, or accidentally. Identity Theft and Your Social Security Number,
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Pub. No. 05-10064, at 4 (Oct. 2007),
available at http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/10064.pdf.
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Unlike names and addresses, social security numbers generally do
not change and thus provide consistency over time." They are
intangible and have no intrinsic value, and therefore do not by
themselves constitute a target for theft. Almost all citizens have
one." Moreover, the existence and use of a common identifier is
virtually indispensable in allowing organizations, whether public
or private, to differentiate one individual from another. For
example, libraries must have a means for identifying who is
borrowing a book; banks must be able to match deposits to
accounts; and universities must be able to track application
materials and academic records. A unique identifier allows these
types of transactions and processes to occur efficiently. Not
surprisingly, the social security number has been credited with
facilitating coordination among government agencies and aiding in
statistical research efforts.2 0
The problem arises less from the fact that many organizations
use the social security number as a means of account identification,
and more from its simultaneous use as a password or "key" that
allows the holder to access or "unlock" the account. As more and
more institutions adopt the social security number, its effectiveness
as a password becomes greatly diminished.2 1 Reflecting the
unfortunate reality that a single number can provide access to
multiple accounts, commentators have lamented that the social
security number has become a "skeleton key" for identity theft
18 Social security numbers can be changed in certain circumstances, such as
where a domestic violence victim is being harassed or abused. See New
Numbers for Domestic Violence Victims, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Pub. No. 05-10093, at 1, available at www.ssa.gov/pubs/10093.pdf.
19 It is estimated that 277 million individuals currently possess a social
security number. Social Security Numbers: Private Sector Entities Frequently
Obtain and Use SSNs, and Laws Limit the Disclosure of This Information, GAO
REPORT 04-11, Jan. 2004, at 4.
20 Social Security Numbers: Government Benefits from SSN Use but Could
Provide Better Safeguards, GAO REPORT 02-352, May 2002, at 16, available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02352.pdf.
' For an enlightened explanation of identification theory and why social
security numbers make poor keys, see Lynn M. LoPucki, Human Identification
Theory and the Identity Theft Problem, 80 TEX. L. REv. 89, 95-100 (2001).
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criminals.22 Even more troubling, the availability of the number
increases in direct proportion to its use as a key. Any organization
that wishes to use an individual's social security number must
make at least one copy of it; this copy is frequently stored in a
computer system that may be accessible by a global workforce of
employees. Given that thousands of organizations collect the
number and share it with affiliates, contractors, government
entities and others, the number's vulnerability to loss, employee
misuse, or theft by third parties quickly becomes apparent. The
advent of the Internet and the proliferation of outsourcing have
only magnified the speed and extent of dispersal of the social
security number. Just as the weakest link will make a chain give
way, the institution with the most lax security procedures or least
honest employees may be the only thing standing between a thief
and the contents of an individual's bank account and private
records.23
How secure would one feel if she gave the key to her home to
every government agency, health care provider, credit card
company, and other business organization with whom she had a
direct or indirect relationship? What would one do if a copy of this
key could be located, inexpensively or even for free on the
internet, by anyone with basic information who is willing to look
for it? Yet this is exactly the system that has been created via the
use of the social security number as a password that can provide
the holder with access to an individual's financial resources,
retirement accounts, private health information, and more. Worse
yet, unlike locks which can be changed if a key is lost or falls into
the wrong hands, the social security number is virtually
unchangeable.24
22 Levy & Stone, supra note 11.
23 See Michael Quint, Bank Robbers' Latest Weapon: Social Security
Numbers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1992, available at http://query.nytimes.com
/gst/fullpage.html?res=9EOCE2D81F39F934A1575ACOA964958260; Daniel J.
Solove, Identity Theft, Privacy, and the Architecture of Vulnerability, 54
HASTINGs L.J. 1227, 1254 (2003) (describing the social security number as a
"magic key that can unlock vast stores of records as well as financial accounts").
24 Jonathan Krim, Net Aids Access to Sensitive ID Data: Social Security
Numbers Are Widely Available, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Apr. 4, 2005, http://
N.C. J.L. & TECH.
This article begins in Part II by highlighting the problems of
identity theft and explaining how widespread use of the social
security number creates an elevated risk of loss. The impact of
recent trends in electronic data aggregation and outsourcing are
emphasized. Part III explores the existing legal framework and
recently enacted laws affecting social security number collection,
display, and storage, and argues that these laws are generally
inadequate. In Part IV, an analytical framework is proposed that
would place the risk of loss on the party that is in the best position
to avoid the loss. Federal laws consistent with this framework are
proposed that would .increase security and reduce risk of loss, all
while minimizing the costs borne by organizations that collect and
use data.
II. A GROWING PROBLEM
A. Personal Data and Identity Theft
The alarming magnitude of identity theft has been widely
recognized and documented.25 State legislatures began to
acknowledge the problem of identity theft in 1996, when Arizona
became the first state in the nation to enact a statute criminalizing
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A23686-2005Apr3.html. Also
unlike a lost key, the social security number cannot be changed merely because
it has been lost or stolen. Identity Theft and Your Social Security Number,
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Pub. No. 05-10064, Oct. 2007, at 6,
available at http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/10064.pdf. There must be evidence that
(1) someone is in fact wrongfully using the number and (2) that the individual to
whom the number belongs is being disadvantaged by the wrongful use. Id.
25 See, e.g., Guin v. Brazos Higher Educ. Servs., 2006 WL 288483, at *6 (D.
Minn. Feb. 7, 2006) (noting the "increasing problem of widespread identity
theft"); Ellen Nakashima & Ylan Q. Mui, Data Theft Grows to Biggest Ever,
WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 2007, available at http://www.washingtonpost .com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/03/29/AR2007032900237.html; Jon Cohen, Poll:
Identity Theft Concerns Rise, ABC NEWS, Mar. 17, 2005,
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/PollVault/story?id=590413&page=l; Caroline
E. Mayer, FTC Says Identity Theft is Rampant: 10 Million Cases in the Past
Year, Survey Concludes, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 4, 2003, available at
http://emoglen.law.columbia.edu/LIS/archive/crime/A22781-2003Sep3.html.
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the theft of one's identity. 26 By 2007, all fifty states had some
form of identity theft legislation on the books.27 Attesting to the
significance of the problem and the fact that identity theft
substantially affects interstate commerce, Congress passed the
Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998, which
criminalized identity theft at the federal level and authorized the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to track the incidence of identity
theft nationwide.28 Pursuant to this authority, the FTC issued its
first identity theft report, covering calendar year 2000, which
reflected approximately 28,000 cases of identity theft.29 In seven
years, the number of consumer identity theft reports to the FTC
increased nearly ten-fold, to over 258,000.30 However, the number
of FTC-reported cases grossly understates the pervasiveness of
identity theft. Reflecting the fact that not all cases of identity theft
are reported, the Federal Bureau of Investigation claims that more
than ten million individuals are victimized by identity theft
annually.'
26 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2008 (2008). See Catherine Pastrikos, Identity
Theft Statutes: Which will Protect Americans the Most?, 67 ALB. L. REv. 1137,
1138 (2004) (noting that Arizona was the first state to enact an identity theft
statute).
27 Combating Identity Theft: A Strategic Plan, THE PRESIDENT'S IDENTITY
THEFT TASK FORCE, Apr. 2007, at 53, available at http://www.identitytheft
.gov/reports/StrategicPlan.pdf [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S IDENTITY THEFT TASK
FORCE].
28 Identity Theft & Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-318,
112 Stat. 3007 (1998) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1028 and 28 U.S.C. § 994).
29 Identity Theft Complaint Data, FED. TRADE COMM'N, Jan. to Dec. 2000, at
1, available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/idtheft/trends-update_2000
.pdf. Of 40,000 complaints received, 69/--or approximately 28,000-were
victims' complaints (the remaining 31 % were requests for information related to
identity theft prevention).
30 Consumer Fraud and Identity Theft Complaint Data, FED. TRADE COMM'N,
Jan. to Dec. 2007, available at http://www.consumer.gov/sentinel/pubs/
Topl0Fraud2007.pdf.
31 How to Protect Your Good Name from Identity Theft, FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, Oct. 20, 2004, http://www.fbi.gov/page2/oct04/preventidt
102104.htm; see also Neal Walters & George Gaberlavage, Protecting Social
Security Numbers from Identity Theft, AARP, Sept. 2005,
http://www.aarp.org/research/frauds-scams/fraud/fs 122_id-theft.html.
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Financial losses from identity theft are as staggering as the
number of individuals affected. The FTC estimates that the total
cost to society exceeds $50 billion per year.32 These figures
include losses both to consumer victims and to businesses that are
defrauded by the identity thief. According to a Department of
Justice estimate, losses to households from identity theft over a
particular six-month period were $3.2 billion.3 ' A study cited by
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that
organizations whose data storage systems were breached sustained
an average loss of $1.4 million per breach,34 and the number and
size of breaches have been increasing exponentially." As far back
as 1997, a single credit card company reported that the losses to its
member banks from identity theft approached $400 million per
year.36 Identity theft has been described as not only the fastest-
32 See A National Strategy to Combat Identity Theft, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, May
2006, at 1, available at http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/files/ric/Publications/
e03062303.pdf. Losses to citizens of other countries can be equally staggering.
See Karen Deame, ID Theft Hits $1 Billion: ABS, AUSTRALIANIT,
http://www.australianit.news.com.aulstory/0,24897,23952995-5013044,00.html
(reporting $977 million in fraud losses to Australians during 2007, including
identity theft losses).
" Identity Theft 2004, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, Apr. 19, 2006, at 1, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/it04.pdf.
34 Data Breaches are Frequent, but Evidence of Resulting Identity Theft Is
Limited; However, the Full Extent Is Unknown, GAO REPORT 07-737, June
2007, at 6, available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07737.pdf.
3 See Courtney Mabeus, OMB Reports Big Increase in Data Breaches in
2007, FED. TIMES, Mar. 1. 2008, http://www.federaltimes.com/index.php?
S=3399508; Tom Zeller, An Ominous Milestone: 100 Million Data Leaks, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 18, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/
12/18/technology/181ink.html.
36 Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998, 144 Cong. Rec.
H9994-01, 1998 WL 694715 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of U.S
Congresswoman Rep. Betty McCollum (4th Dist. MN)).
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growing financial crime in the United States," but also as the
fastest-growing crime in the United States."
There is no doubt that the social security number is central to
the commission of the crime of identity theft. According to a 2002
GAO Report, the social security number is one of three pieces of
information most sought after by identity thieves." The Identity
Theft Resource Center, a national non-profit that is organized for
the purpose of preventing identity theft, includes the social security
number in its definition of identity theft: "a crime in which an
impostor obtains key pieces of . . . information . . . such as Social
Security numbers ... and uses them for [her] own personal
gain."40 Jones Day, an international law firm employing more than
2,000 attorneys, describes the social security number as "the No. 1
identifier used by criminals in identity theft."4 1 During the
congressional testimony leading up to the passage of the 1998
Federal Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act, repeated
references were made to the social security number and the
problems that arise when it is obtained by identity thieves.4 2
Tellingly, the Social Security Administration itself counsels
against the disclosure of the social security number as a means to
avoid identity theft,43 and "discourages banks and businesses from
37 Press Release, N.Y. State Governor's Press Releases, Governor Patterson
Unveils Legislation to Strengthen New York's Identity Theft Laws (May 21,
2008), http://www.ny.gov/governor/press/press_0521081.html.
38 Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998, 144 Cong. Rec.
H9995-01, 1998 WL 694715 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of U.S
Congressman Rep. John Shadegg (3rd Dist. AZ)).
39 Social Security Numbers: Government Benefits from SSN Use, supra note
20, at 9 (describing the other two pieces of information as names and birth
certificates).
40 Identity Theft Resource Center, http://www.idtheftcenter.org/ (last visited
June 1, 2008).
41 Mauricio F. Paez, New York Enacts Social Security Number Protection
Law, JONES DAY COMMENTARIES, Oct. 2006, http://www.jonesday.com/pubs/
pubsdetail.aspx?publD=S3778.
42 See Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998, 144 Cong. Rec.
H9993-01, 1998 WL 694715 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998).
4 3 Identity Theft and Your Social Security Number, SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION, Pub. No. 05-10064 (Oct. 2007) http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/
10064.pdf.
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using the number as proof of identification."" Finally, the
President's Identity Theft Task Force described the social security
number as "critical,"4 5 the "key,"46 and the "most valuable
commodity for an identity thief,"47 and called for a reduction in the
unnecessary use of the number.48
B. The Data Aggregation Explosion
Identity theft is nothing new and has certainly existed in one
form or another for centuries or longer.49 Nor are recorded
birthdays, mother's maiden names, or even social security numbers
a particularly recent phenomenon. What has changed is that,
within the last two decades, evolving business practices and a
dynamic business environment have converged with technological
advances to create conditions ripe for data theft and identity misuse
on an unprecedented scale. So fundamental and transformative are
these changes that they have inspired the moniker of the modem
era, variously referred to as the information age, the internet age,
or-as in the title to this article-the digital age.
As the digital age dawned and electronic records replaced
paper records, the volume of consumer information that could be
practically stored increased by several orders of magnitude.
Electronic records require less space, are less expensive to
reproduce and transfer, and are more easily searchable than were
paper records."o The ability to share data electronically meant that
national organizations that collected information locally could
centralize computer databases for customer convenience or simply
"Michael Quint, supra note 23.
45THE PRESIDENT'S IDENTITY THEFT TASK FORCE, supra note 27, at 42.
46 THE PRESIDENT'S IDENTITY THEFT TASK FORCE, supra note 27, at 23.
47 THE PRESIDENT'S IDENTITY THEFT TASK FORCE, supra note 27, at 4.
48 THE PRESIDENT'S IDENTITY THEFT TASK FORCE, supra note 27, at 23.
49 Identity Theft Reporting System, UTAH ATTY. GEN.'s OFFICE, http://www.
idtheft.utah.gov/pn/module-PS-viewpub-tid-2-pid-1.htm (last visited June 1,
2008).
50 Bloom, supra note 6, at 12 ("Digital technology has made the ability to
obtain, collect, compile, manipulate, mine, and transfer data vastly easier .... .").
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for business efficiency." This customer information-sharing
became so important that a whole category of business software
developed to manage digitized customer information, called
customer relationship management (CRM) software.5 2 Nor was
collected information exclusively retained by the collecting entity.
Recognizing the value of customer information, businesses" and
even state governments" began to package and sell consumer
information to third parties in enormous volumes. In 2006, the
GAO identified fifty-three websites that specifically offer to sell a
person's social security number."
At the same time electronic data storage and sharing were
becoming easier, cheaper, and more common, businesses across a
broad range of industries were growing dramatically in size via
mergers and acquisitions," thereby further magnifying the
51 Social Security Numbers: Private Sector Entities Frequently Obtain and
Use SSNs, and Laws Limit the Disclosure of This Information, GAO REPORT 04-
11, Jan. 2004, at 4.
52 See Chris Gaither, Software to Track Customers' Needs Helped Firms
React, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2001, at Cl, available at http://query.nytimes
.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=940CE3DF153DF932A35753CIA9679C8B63&sec
=&spon=&pagewanted=all (describing the market for CRM software as a "$6.5
billion ... industry").
5 Just one data broker, ChoicePoint, has assembled literally billions of pieces
of information about millions of individuals, and offers this information for sale
to more than 50,000 customers. Robert O'Harrow, Jr., In Age of Security, Firms
Mine Wealth of Personal Data, WASH. POST, January 20, 2005, available
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A22269-2005Janl 9.html;
see also Evan Perez & Rick Brooks, File Sharing: For Big Vendor of Personal
Data, A Theft Lays Bare the Downside, WALL ST. J., May 3, 2005, at Al
("ChoicePoint Inc. has 19 billion data files, full of personal information about
nearly every American adult.").
54 See infra Part III.C.3.
5 Social Security Numbers: Internet Resellers Provide Few Full SSNs, but
Congress Should Consider Enacting Standards for Truncating SSNs, GAO-06-
495, May 17, 2006, at 3.
56 See Robert Pitofsky, FTC Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, Prepared
Remarks, Merger Competition and Policy-The Way Ahead (Aug. 4, 1998)
(transcript available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/canada.sp2.shtm)
("[T]he United States set an all-time record last year when roughly 3,700
proposed mergers . . . were filed with the . .. Federal Trade Commission. Many
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aggregation of data. Big box retailers emerged on the scene while
already sizeable domestic companies expanded their reach around
the globe." Nor was database growth limited to the private sector.
Increasingly, government entities at all levels saw the need for, and
practicality of, electronic data sharing."
The Internet provided an unneeded boost in this already
thriving data aggregation explosion." Not only could the Internet
facilitate the sharing and distribution of data,"o it could also provide
a cost-effective means for data collection. The Internet and stand-
alone electronic terminals allowed businesses to shift the cost of
data collection and entry from employees to consumers. As long
as appropriate software was in place, an enormous volume of data
could be voluntarily entered by consumers at virtually no cost to
the business, all while increasing the number of customers that
could be serviced per unit time. Whether entering personal data at
a United Parcel Service shipping terminal or completing the
ubiquitous web registration, the consumer populace was henceforth
conscripted to enter terabytes of information as part of the process
of completing a transaction. Declining to provide information was
of us thought that the merger wave could become no greater than in 1997. To
my surprise, merger filings ... have increased [since then] . . .").
5 See William M. Bulkeley, Cut Down to Size: 'Category Killers' Go From
Lethal to Lame In the Space of a Decade, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 2000, at Al
("'[C]ategory killers' ... remade the retailing landscape in the 1990s" by
"underpricing department stores and mom-and-pops. .. ."). Concerns over
increasing business size are not new. Emile Zola's classic 1883 novel "Au
Bonheur des Dames" described the difficulties faced by small stores as a new
form of business - known as the department store - was coming of age. See
EMILE ZOLA, Au BONHEUR DES DAMES (Larousse 2006) (1883).
58 Social Security Numbers: Government Benefits from SSN Use, supra note
20, at 15 ("[T]he majority of agencies at all three levels of government reported
sharing information containing SSNs .... ); Bloom, supra note 6, at 5 ("[S]tate
and local governments increasingly create comprehensive databases ...
containing ... vast amounts of personal data .. . .").
59 Bloom, supra note 6, at 2; Dearne, supra note 32 ("[P]ersonal fraud is a
growing crime type due to the rapid expansion and availability of the internet,
and the increase in electronic storage, transmission and sharing of data.").
60 The internet has been used in eBay-like fashion as a means of connecting
buyers and sellers of stolen identities. See Charles Herman, Online Identity
Theft Ring Out of the Shadows, ABC NEWS, June 29, 2006, http://
abcnews.go.com/Technology/story?id=2136453.
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not an option, unless one was willing to forgo a large and ever-
increasing portion of everyday products and services.
Unfortunately, the aggregation of vast amounts of data is like
the hoarding of treasure: while few will bother to pick up a penny
lying on the sidewalk, a bank vault full of cash will draw thieves
and imposters from far afield. Similarly, a large data warehouse
will attract thieves who might not find it worthwhile to rifle
through a mailbox to obtain the data of a single individual.
The treasure of personal information is in turn a key that
enables thieves to access more traditional forms of treasure, such
as the cash in a savings account. Robbers that might once have
been thwarted by the steel, concrete, and sophisticated devices
guarding traditional bank vaults can now use others' personal
information to induce banks to hand over the cash willingly.
Moreover, while laws protect physical embodiments of value such
as cash, the value of non-secret data is largely unrecognized by
law. As a result, vast treasure troves of vault-defeating personal
information may be virtually unguarded."1 This is only the
beginning of the allure of identity theft. Making the crime even
more attractive to thieves is the fact that the "bank" will point the
finger, at least initially, at the wrong thief: the victim of the
identity theft, rather than the perpetrator. Not surprisingly, a recent
year witnessed twice as many identity thefts as traditional
robberies.62
C. "Information Wants to Be Free"
In 1984 Stewart Brand proclaimed that "information wants to
be free."63 This characterization is particularly appropriate in the
61 Jonathan Krim, Ubiquitous Technology, Bad Practices Drive Up Data
Theft, WASH. POsT, June 22, 2005, at DI, D5, available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/21/
AR2005062101615 3.html (noting the weak security protecting personal data).
62 Kenneth M. Siegel, Protecting the Most Valuable Corporate Asset:
Electronic Data, Identity Theft, Personal Information, and the Role of Data
Security in the Information Age, 111 PENN ST. L. REv. 779, 783-84 (2007).
63 See Laura N. Gasaway, Values Conflict in the Digital Environment:
Librarians Versus Copyright Holders, 24 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 115, 133
n.104 (2000).
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context of personal consumer information such as the social
security number, where restricting distribution of the information
once it has been provided to a data-collecting entity is about as
easy as convincing the media not to air breaking news. This is
partially due to the fact that information sharing in most industries
is virtually unrestricted. Even where federal legislation places
restrictions on the transfer of personal information, organizations
are generally free to share that information with affiliates,
subcontractors, and other third parties so long as certain conditions
are met.'
In some cases, information must be made available to the
public by laws such as the Freedom of Information Act" or the
social security statute itself." In other cases, government records
are made available to enhance public trust, encourage
accountability, and promote the integrity of judicial and other
government processes." In order to provide greater public service
and access, government records that were once publicly accessible
only via in-person site visits are increasingly being made available
online." While this facilitates legitimate access to information, it
can also act as a boon to those with less scrupulous motives. In
one notable incident, the names, addresses, phone numbers, and
social security numbers of Washington State police officers were
assembled from publicly available records and posted on the
6 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 6802 (2008) (Financial institutions may disclose non-
public personal information to both affiliated and unaffiliated third parties
provided certain conditions "are met, including limitations on reuse and sharing
for marketing purposes.").
65 Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-554 (1966) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2008)).
66 See 42 U.S.C. § 405 (2006) (describing several purposes for which the
social security number may or must be disclosed).
67 Social Security Numbers: Government Benefits from SSN Use, supra note
20, at 12.
68 Bloom, supra note 6, at 8 (explaining that publicly available paper records -
as opposed to electronic records - were relegated to "practical obscurity" due to
high search costs and other factors); Social Security Numbers: Government
Benefits from SSN Use, supra note 20, at 8.
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Internet."9 Such troubling behavior is facilitated by the forty-one
states and 75% of United States counties that display social
security numbers in public records."o
Where information is not shared voluntarily, it may be stolen
or misused.7 1 Collected data stored in electronic form is in many
ways more vulnerable to theft than old-fashioned paper records.
First, theft of enormous volumes of electronic data can be
accomplished quickly by downloading to a flash drive or to a
networked computer. Second, data thieves need not physically
"break-in" to an office where records are stored, and may instead
surreptitiously hack into computer networks while maintaining a
safe distance.72 In this sense, it is fitting that Stewart Brand made
his now-famous statement at a hackers' conference. Third, theft
by disgruntled or opportunistic employees is made easier by
having data in electronic form. Rather than having to stand at the
photocopy machine with incriminating files in hand, employees
may be able to download directly from their workstations or home
office, which is an activity an observer may have difficulty
differentiating from the performance of ordinary job
69 Adam Liptak, A Web Site Causes Unease in Police, N.Y. TIMES, July 12,
2003, at A12, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=
9802E2D91E3DF931A25754COA9659C8B63.
70 PRESIDENT'S IDENTITY THEFT TASK FORCE, supra note 27, at 24.
71 Social security numbers may also be inadvertently exposed when
employees download file sharing services such as LimeWire. See Brian Krebs,
Justice Breyer Is Among Victims in Data Breach Caused by File Sharing,
WASH. PosT, July 9, 2008, at Al, A12, available at http://www.washingtonpost
.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/08/ AR2008070802997_pf.html (reporting
that Pfizer, the Walter Reed Army Medical Center, and a McLean, Virginia
investment firm have all experienced this type of breach).
72 See, e.g., Jordan Robertson, Citibank ATM Breach Reveals PIN Security
Problems, ASSOCIATED PRESS, http://www.nydailynews.com/money/2008/07
/01/2008-07-01 citibankatm breach revealspin security.html, July 3, 2008
(reporting that hackers stole millions of dollars after breaking into a bank's
ATM network and gaining access to customers' unencrypted personal
identification numbers).
7 See Katie Hafner, A New Way of Verifying Old and Familiar Sayings, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 1, 2001, at G8, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fillpage
.html?res=9407E7DC163EF932A35751COA9679C8B63 ("information wants to
be free").
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responsibilities.74 Fourth, electronic data theft can be
accomplished without leaving obvious evidence of the theft, and
data breaches may therefore go unnoticed for long periods of time.
Not surprisingly, "[t]he FTC and law enforcement agencies have
found that merchants and retailers are increasingly vulnerable to
disgruntled or dishonest employees with access to huge databases
full of Social Security numbers that can be sold illegally or used
for fraud.""
Two cases illustrate just how easy it is for a dishonest
employee to abscond with private information. In 1993 a
California resident became a victim as a result of completing
intake forms at her doctor's office." The doctor's receptionist
misappropriated the patient's social security number and moved to
Las Vegas where the number was used to commit identity theft."
A decade later, a salesman used a Colorado customer's birth date
and social security number to obtain a surgical procedure and then
left the $40,000 tab to the customer." These two examples are
exceptional in the sense that the perpetrator of the identity theft
was known. In the majority of cases, victims do not know how,
when, or by whom their private information was obtained.79
74 Krause, supra note 8 (citing a study revealing that "nearly twenty three
percent of identity theft cases ... were the result of 'dishonest employees"');
Brian Krebs, Data Breaches Are up 69% This Year, Nonprofit Says, WASH.
PosT, July 1, 2008, at D3, available at http://www. washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/06/30/AR2008063002123_pf .html (identifying that the
percentage of breaches caused by employee theft more than doubled from 2007
to the first half of 2008).
7 William McCall, Identity Theft Often Begins with Social Security Number,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 5, 2004, available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/
news/2004-01-05-ssn-id-theft x.htm.
76 See TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (2000).
77 d
78 PRESIDENT'S IDENTITY THEFT TASK FORCE, supra note 27, at 25.
7 Prepared Statement of the FTC on Identity Theft, Sept. 13, 2000, § II.A.,
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/09/idthefttest.htm.
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D. Outsourcing
Not only have enormous data-aggregation centers emerged, but
outsourcing has led to the sharing of personal data with contractors
and business partners, who may in turn share information with
their contractors and business partners."o As the internet renders
geographic limitations a nullity, private information may cross
national borders with startling facility where it is safeguarded only
by the honesty of a distant employee or a host country's privacy
laws. Even where such laws exist and employees are generally
honest, a large sum of money offered as a bribe in return for
information may be tempting indeed to someone earning a few
dollars per hour as a customer service representative.8 1
Dishonest or desperate employees may use confidential
information as a bargaining chip to extort money or win
concessions. Such a scenario is not as far-fetched as it sounds. In
2003, employees of an Ohio company working in India threatened
to release confidential data if their demands were not met." In
another similar case, a medical transcriptionist in Pakistan working
indirectly for the University of California at San Francisco (UCSF)
threatened the release of private data that had been obtained via a
string of subcontracting arrangements." She was employed as a
subcontractor for a Florida company that was in turn a
80 See generally Social Security Numbers: Government Benefits from SSN
Use, supra note 20, at 18-19 (noting that government agencies not only share
social security numbers with other government agencies, but also with
contractors, credit bureaus, insurance companies, debt collection agencies,
researchers, private investigators, and even marketing companies).
81 Along these lines, a credit card call center employee reportedly misused
customer accounts to accumulate $65,000 of fraudulent purchases. Data
Breaches Are Frequent, supra note 34, at 21. Similarly, twenty-seven cases of
identity theft were tied to a former FDIC intern who inappropriately accessed
employee information. Social Security Numbers: Government Benefits from
SSN Use, supra note 20, at 23.
82 Outsourcing Privacy: Countries Processing US. Social Security Numbers,
Health Information, Tax Records Lack Fundamental Privacy Safeguards, STAFF
REPORT OF REP. EDWARD J. MARKEY, Sept. 2005, at 2, http://markey.
house.gov/docs/privacy/iss privacyrep05O914.pdf.
83 Id.
FALL 2008] 17
N.C. J.L. & TECH.
subcontractor for a California company that was a contractor for
UCSF.84
That sensitive data may be vulnerable when it is disbursed
through multiple layers of geographically and culturally diverse
intermediaries and affiliates is hardly surprising. Not only do
numerous employees have access to the data, but varying levels of
security provide an increased likelihood of a data breach. The
GAO has reported that breaches at financial institutions are
"typically due to lapses in data security by [a] third-party entity
[such as a contractor or subcontractor] and not the financial
institution itself."" For example, in Pisciotta v. Old National
Bancorp,86 the private data of tens of thousands of site users was
exposed after a security breach at NCR, an independent
organization that maintained Old National Bancorp's website.
Similarly, in the 2006 case of Forbes v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,"
private data was compromised when computers belonging to
Regulus were stolen.
Of course, the mere exposure of data or potential to penetrate a
database does not necessarily lead to identity theft. Yet this hardly
justifies an ostrich-like refusal to acknowledge the threat posed by
the needless or careless exposure of data. To an identity thief, an
organization that aggregates vast amounts of feebly-protected data
in a central location is a Wal-Mart full of pre-packaged identity
theft kits, a tempting proposition to be sure. Not surprisingly,
organized criminal groups from around the world are increasingly
turning to identity theft," sometimes obtaining data by hacking
84 David Lazarus, Outsourced UCSF Notes Highlight Privacy Risk, SAN
FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Mar. 28, 2004, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2004/03/28/MNGFS308OR264.DTL.
85 Data Breaches Are Frequent, supra note 34, at 15 n.26.
86 499 F.3d 629, 632 (7th Cir. 2007).
87 420 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1019 (D.C. Minn. 2006) (stating that Regulus was an
independent service provider hired by a subsidiary of Wells Fargo to print
account statements).
88 Bob Sullivan, Huge Identity Theft Ring Busted, MSNBC, Nov. 25, 2002,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3078518/ (describing a Nigerian crime ring that
stole 30,000 identities and used the data to tap victims' bank accounts); Identity
Theft: The Organized Crime Factor, IDENTITY THEFT KNOWLEDGE CENTER,
Aug. 2003, http://identitytheft9l 1.org/articles/article.ext?sp=90 ("[M]ore and
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into corporate databases." To cite just one example, the
Department of Justice recently reported the indictment of eleven
individuals from the United States, Estonia, Ukraine, Belarus, and
China who allegedly conspired to hack into databases at TJX, BJ's,
Barnes & Noble, Sports Authority, DSW, and others.o Allegedly,
the conspirators sold some of the more than forty million credit
and debit card numbers obtained to other criminals both in the
United States and abroad." Losses to banks, retailers, and
consumers are estimated to be "at least tens of millions of
dollars."9 2
The disconcerting vulnerability of databases has been
repeatedly illustrated by data breaches, such as those in Pisciotta
and Forbes, which have reached epic proportions over the last five
years. The number of records compromised by data breaches
reported in the United States has grown to over 229 million, up
dramatically from the 90 million reported less than two years
previously.94 While some of these records may duplicate
information for a single individual, it is worthwhile to recall that
the population of the United States is just over 300 million
more groups from overseas are making their way over here [to commit identity
theft].").
89 See Susan B. Shor, International Identity Theft Ring Discovered, TECH
NEWS WORLD, Aug. 9, 2005, http://www.technewsworld.com/story/45337
.html?welcome=1213457984 (describing a ring that used spyware to nab
customer social security numbers and other data at fifty international banks); see
also PRESIDENT'S IDENTITY THEFT TASK FORCE, supra note 27, at 19
(describing foreign computer hackers that penetrated corporate databases).
90 Eleven Indicted in Largest ID Theft Case Ever, CBS NEWS, Aug. 5, 2008,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/08/05/tech/main4323211 .shtml.
9' Retail Hacking Ring Charged for Stealing and Distributing Credit and
Debit Card Numbers from Major U.S. Retailers, DEPT. OF JUSTICE, Aug. 5,
2008, http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/August/08-ag-689.html.
92 Brent Kendall, Third Update: Eleven Charged With Massive Identity Theft,
CNN MONEY, Aug. 5, 2008, http://62.1.2.134/dj/news.asp?details=551805.
93A Chronology of Data Breaches, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE,
http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm (last visited May 31,
2008).
94 Kathryn E. Picanso, Note: Protecting Information Security Under a
Uniform Data Breach Notification Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 355, 369 n.103
(2006).
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individuals,9 5 and that an estimated 277 million individuals have
social security numbers.9 6 The President's Identity Theft Task
Force reported that during a single year the records of 73 million
people were lost or stolen. Therefore, data breaches have likely
touched a large majority of those who have records to compromise.
E. Selected Data Breach Cases
In January 2007, the TJX Companies announced one of the
largest and most disturbing security breaches to date, which
involved the theft of forty-six million credit card and debit card
numbers including the personal information of at least 500,000
customers.98 Two months later TJX realized that the true extent of
the breach was almost 100 times greater and raised the number of
those affected to 45.7 million.99 TJX again increased the estimate
in October 2007 to at least 94 million.o The theft began in the
summer of 2005 in the parking lot of Marshalls, one of the retail
stores owned by TJX. Hackers reportedly used a primitive
"telescope-shaped antenna" with a laptop computer to access and
intercept data transmitted via the store's wireless network.'0 ' The
cost to TJX associated with the theft over the next several years
95 U.S. POPClock Projection, US CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov
/population/www/popclockus.html (last visited June 5, 2008).
96 Barbara D. Bovbjerg, Use of the Social Security Number Is Widespread,
Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Social Security, Committee on Ways
and Means, House of Representatives, 1 (May 9, 2000), available at
http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/he00111t.pdf.
97 PRESIDENT'S IDENTITY THEFT TASK FORCE, supra note 27, at 3.
98 Dan Goodin, Lax Security Led to TJX Breach, THE REGISTER, May 4, 2007,
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/05/04/txjnonfeasance/print.html (last visited
Dec. 1, 2007).
9 Mark Jewell, More Accounts Involved in TJX Breach, MSNBC.CoM, Oct.
24, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21454847 (last visited Nov. 4, 2008).
00 d. See also TJ. Maxx Owner: 46M Card Numbers Stolen,
CNNMONEY.COM, Mar. 29, 2007, http://money.cnn.com/2007/03/29/news/
companies/tjx/index.htm (noting that "455,000 customers who returned
merchandise without receipts had their personal data stolen, including driver's
license numbers").
1o1 Joseph Pereira, How Credit Card Data Went Out the Wireless Door, WSJ
ONLINE, May 4, 2007, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB117824446226991797
.html.
20 [VOL. 10: 1
Data Collection Practices
exclusive of insurance coverage, tax credits and possible litigation,
has been estimated by Forrester Research to be over one billion
dollars. 10 2
In 2005, the FTC issued a complaint against BJ's Wholesale
Club, 0 3 a membership club with eight million members.1 4 When
members made credit or debit card purchases, BJ's collected
personal information from the magnetic stripe including card
numbers, expiration dates and other information, to be used in
obtaining payment authorization from the bank that issued the
card.s0 5  In its complaint the FTC alleged that BJ's facilitated
fraudulent purchases of over $13 million' 06 by failing to
adequately secure and protect stored information. 107 Specifically,
while BJ's stored the information on its computer networks, it
failed to encrypt the information, which allowed the information to
be accessed anonymously. BJ's failed to employ readily available
security means to limit such access or to detect unauthorized
accesses, and stored the information up to thirty days after it was
102 See Ross Kerber, Analysts: TJX Case May Cost over $1b, BosTON.coM,
Apr. 12, 2007, http://www.boston.com/business/personalfinance/articles/2007/
04/12/analyststjxcase may cost over I b/?page=2. The U.S. Postal
Inspection Service announced that Maksym Yastremskiy, a Ukrainian, was
arrested in Turkey on suspicion of stealing and selling thousands if not millions
of credit and debit card numbers stolen from TJX customers. Ross Kerber,
Suspect Named in TJX Credit Card Probe, BOSTON.COM, Aug. 21, 2007,
http://www.boston.com/business/globe/articles/2007/08/21 /suspect named intj
xcreditcardprobe/.
103 Complaint, In re BJ's Wholesale Club, No. C-4148 (F.T.C. Sept. 20,
2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0423160/092305comp
0423160.pdf.
1' BJ's Wholesale Club Settles FTC Charges: Agency Says Lax Security
Compromised Thousands of Credit and Debit Cards, FEDERAL TRADE
COMMissioN, F.T.C. File No. 0423160, June 16, 2005, http://www.ftc.gov
/opa/2005/06/bjswholesale.shtm.
105id
106 id.
107 Id. Thieves were able to create counterfeit copies of member debit and
credit cards that contained the same personal information BJ's had collected and
stored. Id.
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no longer necessary to keep it.1os The FTC considered this an
unfair practice likely to cause substantial consumer injury "that
was not reasonably avoidable by consumers and not outweighed"
by countervailing benefits to consumers or competition.' 09
Subsequently, BJ's entered into a consent agreement with the FTC
agreeing to establish and maintain a program that provided for
administrative, technical and physical safeguards with audits by an
independent third party to assure compliance.I1 0 These audits are to
continue every other year for twenty years and must be submitted
to the FTC."'
In 2005, the FTC filed a complaint against DSW Inc., a
national chain of retail shoe stores, alleging that, as with BJ's,
DSW failed to adequately protect personal information collected
from debit and credit cards and stored on its computer networks.1 12
As a result, third parties made fraudulent charges after they
accessed the information contained in 1.4 million credit cards and
96,000 checking accounts." 3  DSW entered into a consent
agreement with the FTC in which the terms were virtually identical
to BJ's above, with the added requirement that DSW allow the
FTC to monitor compliance.' 14
Retailers are only one of many access points to the raw
materials needed for identity theft. Academic institutions,
government bodies, and others have provided sobering examples
of the vulnerability of personal data. In 2005, Ohio University
108 Complaint, In re BJ's Wholesale Club, No. C-4148, 7 (F.T.C. Sept. 20,
2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0423160/092305comp
0423160.pdf.
109 Id. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2006) (prohibiting unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in the marketplace).
110 Decision and Order, In re BJ's Wholesale Club, No. C-4148, at 2 (F.T.C.
Sept. 20, 2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0423160/092305
do0423160.pdf
1" Id at 3.
112 Complaint, In re DSW, Inc., No. C-4157, at 7 (F.T.C. Mar. 7, 2006),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0523096/0523096c4l57DSW
Complaint.pdf.
1"DSW Inc. Settles FTC Charges, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Dec. 1,
2005, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/12/dsw.shtm.
114 id.
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(OU) suffered a series of security breaches when its Hudson Health
Care Center was attacked by hackers who accessed the personal
information-including social security numbers, identification
numbers, addresses and medical records-of over 60,000
students."' The second breach involved 137,000 social security
numbers and other data of over 300,000 alumni. The final breach
targeted OU's Innovation Center, where hackers were able to
access and compromise additional social security numbers and
other personal information.116
In May 2006, the U.S. Veterans Affairs (VA) Department
announced that a laptop belonging to one of its data analysts was
stolen when his home had been burglarized."' At the time, the VA
had no clear policy that indicated the procedure for protecting data
when outside the VA's network. The laptop contained the names,
social security numbers, dates of birth (including those of some of
the veterans' spouses), and data related to disability ratings of
approximately 26 million veterans."' Subsequently, on June 29,
2006 the laptop was found, and after a forensic analysis the VA
indicated it found no evidence that the personal information
contained in the data had been compromised.'19
115 Greg Sandoval, University Server in Hackers' Hands for a Year,
CNETNEWS.COM, May 22, 2006, http://news.cnet.com/2102-7349_3-6074739
.html.
116 Martin H. Bosworth, Ohio University: Data Breach Central?,
CONSUMERAFFAIRS.COM, May 15, 2006, http://www.consumeraffairs
.com/news04/ 2006/05/ohio u data theft.html.
" Greg Sandoval, Veterans Data Swiped in Theft, CNET NEWS, May 22,
2006, http://news.cnet.com/Veterans-data-swiped-in-theft/2100-1029_3-60752
12.html.
118 Id. See also Review of Issues Related to the Loss of VA Information
Involving the Identity of Millions of Veterans, DEPT. OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, Rep. No. 06-02238-163, July 11, 2006, at 4,
available at http://www.va.gov/oig/51/FY2006rpts/VAOIG-06-02238-163.pdf
[hereinafter Review of Issues] (noting that the data was actually contained on an
external hard drive that was stolen along with the laptop).
119 Review of Issues, supra note 118, at 2. The VA suffered another smaller
security breach in August 2006, when a computer containing data related to the
medical records and other personal information of 18,000 veterans went missing
from Unisys, a subcontractor providing software support for VA medical
centers. Lisa Lerer, Lost Laptops Law, FORBES.COM, Sept. 27, 2006,
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Many other large scale security breaches have occurred,
including one involving AOLl 20  and another involving
LexisNexis.121
III. EXISTING LAW DOES NOT ADEQUATELY PROTECT
CONSUMERS
In the wake of national media attention and a growing
consumer voice, both federal and state legislatures have
criminalized identity theft and provided stiff penalties. 2 2 A first-
time conviction under the federal identity theft act, not in
connection with violence or terrorism, carries a maximum prison
term of fifteen years and can result in a fine and forfeiture of any
personal property used to commit the offense.'23 Other federal
statutes add an additional layer of deterrence by prohibiting crimes
that may be committed concurrently with or as an adjunct to
identity theft, such as credit card fraud,'24 computer fraud,"' mail
fraud,'2 1 wire fraud,'2 7 and financial institution fraud.'28 Violations
of these statutes are felonies and provide for significant prison
terms of up to twenty years along with forfeiture of property used
to commit the offense.'2 9 Many state statutes provide for similarly
stiff penalties.'
http://www.forbes.com/2006/09/27/lost-laptops-law-
biz cx 11 09271aptops.html.
1im Hu, AOL Security Breach Exposes Personal Info, CNET NEWS, June
16, 2000, http://news.cnet.com/2102-1023_3-242034.html.
121 Associated Press, LexisNexis Theft Much Worse than Thought, MSNBC,
Apr. 12, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7475594/ ("[I]ntruders may have
accessed personal details of . . . 310,000 people.").
122 For a list of state identity theft statutes, see Identity Theft Statutes and
Criminal Penalties, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGIS., http:/www.
ncsl.org/programs/lis/privacy/idt-statutes.htm (last visited June 4, 2008).
123 18 U.S.C. § 1028(b) (2006).
124 Id. at § 1029.
125 Id. at § 1030.
126 Id. at § 1341.
121 Id. at § 1343.
128 Id. at § 1344.
129 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1029(c) (2006).
13o See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-8-192 (2008); CAL. PENAL CODE 530.5 (West
2008); D.C. CODE § 22-3227.02 (2008); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/16G-1 -
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A. The Difficulty in Deterring and Prosecuting the Identity Thief
Despite substantial penalties and universal recognition of the
problem, the crime of identity theft continues to claim millions of
victims and bleed the economy of billions of dollars each year."'
Why have identity thieves not been sufficiently deterred? The
answer is in part that committing identity theft is very easy, while
catching and prosecuting identity thieves is extremely difficult.'32
A Public Broadcasting Service television host reported that he was
able to generate enough information to steal the identities of
300,000 people within one hour by combining new and old
versions of CD-ROM databases sold by the government.'33
LifeLock, the company made famous by its one million dollar
guarantee against identity theft and whose chief executive officer
flaunts his real social security number in company commercials,'34
concedes that "you can't stop every form of identity theft.""'
Indeed, the CEO himself became a victim."' Because the "theft"
of information, unlike that of physical possessions, does not
deprive the owner of her property, the victim may not realize that
her identity has been stolen until months or years after the fact."'
Such a delay is more than enough time to place a large distance
5/16G-40 (West 2008); MAsS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. 266 § 37E (West 2008); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 609.527 (West 2008); N.Y. PENAL LAW. § 190.77-190.84
(McKinney 2008).
'3' See supra Part II.A.
132 See generally Levy & Stone, supra note 11 (describing identity theft as
quick, easy, and low risk).
'33 See Robert X. Cringely, How to Steal $65 Billion: Why Identity Theft is a
Growth Industry, PUBLIC BROADCASTING SERVICE, Sept. 11, 2003,
http://www.pbs.org/cringely/pulpit/2003/pulpit 20030911 000785.html.
134 See Lifelock Homepage, http://www.lifelock.com/ (last visited Nov. 4,
2008).
1s Kim Zetter, LifeLock Founder Resigns Amid Controversy, WIRED, June 11,
2007, http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/06/lifelockfounde_ 1.html.
13 6 Id.
137 Betsy Broder, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Prepared Statement of the FTC on
Identity Theft to the Committee on Banking and Financial Services in the United
States House of Representatives (Sept. 13, 2000), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/09/idthefttest.htm ("The FTC has received
numerous reports from consumers who were not aware that they had been
victimized ... until four or more years after the first fraudulent transaction.").
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between the thief and the victim, if they were ever in proximity at
all. Estimates vary, but most agree that well over ninety percent of
identity thieves are never brought to justice.' Even where the
thief is identified, pursuing a thief in a distant or even overseas'
forum might be cost ineffective and pose jurisdictional
challenges.140 Where a thief is both identified and caught locally,
she may be impecunious. Even in the best of circumstances-
where a thief is caught and returns the stolen money-the victim
cannot be adequately compensated for her loss of reputation and
effort spent dealing with the problem. In short, laws directed at the
identity thief cannot by themselves provide an adequate remedy.
B. Suing the Data Collector
The high profile lawsuits pursued against Napster'41 and other
file-sharing services in the early twenty-first century mainstreamed
the idea of secondary liability in the minds of American
consumers. These suits stood for the proposition that, if data was
wrongfully transferred to a third party who could not herself be
held accountable, the enabler of the transfer could be sued directly
as a "secondary" wrongdoer. Thus, as newly enacted laws proved
themselves powerless to sufficiently rein in identity theft-and as
138 See generally Levy & Stone, supra note 11 (citing Avivah Litan, of the
research firm Gartner Group, who speculates that fewer than 1 in 700 identity
crimes leads to a conviction); Helen Giddings, Staying Ahead of Identity Theft,
NAT'L NOTARY Ass'N, July 15, 2005, http://www.nationalnotary.org/
news/index.cfm?Text-newsNotary&newslD=675 ("95 percent of identity thefts
are never solved"); Ed Dadisho, Identity Theft and the Police Response: The
Problem, THE POLICE CHIEF, Jan. 2005, at 25, 26, available at
http://policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfmn?fuseaction=display&article
id=493&issue id=12005 ("Law offices reported that very few identity theft
cases are solved."); John Leland, Meth Users, Attuned to Detail, Add Another
Habit: ID Theft, NY TIMES, July 11, 2006, at Al, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/ 11/us/11 meth.html?pagewanted-print
("[M]ost [identity theft] crimes are never solved.").
139 PRESIDENT'S IDENTITY THEFT TASK FORCE, supra note 27, at 58 (noting
that "a significant portion of the identity theft committed in the United States
originates in other countries"); Krim, supra note 61 ("[A] thriving black market
for the stolen data ... exists online, run in large part from Eastern Europe.").
140 PRESIDENT'S IDENTITY THEFT TASK FORCE, supra note 27, at 59.
141 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
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the news media continued to report ever larger data security
breaches-consumers naturally began to look to the enablers of
identity theft for recourse. Lawsuits against data collectors could
not be brought on a secondary liability theory per se because it
would be difficult to allege that data collectors intentionally
contributed to or financially benefited from the thefts, but the idea
was essentially the same. As courts at all levels bought into the
theory of secondary liability for copyright infringement, giants like
Napster, Aimster, Grokster, and others were brought down in a
firestorm of litigation as consumers watched with amazement.'4 2
Secondary liability, of course, was nothing new, and the courts
had merely extended to a new context a doctrine that was well
established in nearly every area of the law.'43 Nevertheless, as
newly enacted laws proved themselves powerless to sufficiently
rein in identity theft and the news media continued to report on
ever larger data security breaches, consumers naturally looked to
what were seen as the enablers of identity theft for recourse.
Lawsuits against the data collectors could not be brought on a
secondary liability theory per se-it would be difficult to allege
that data collectors intentionally contributed to or financially
benefited from the theftsl'-but the idea was essentially the same.
If the problem could not be solved at its natural end point, perhaps
it could be solved further upstream. Armed with this ideological
perspective, consumers and their attorneys began to develop
theories by which data collectors could be held liable when data
breaches exposed sensitive information that could potentially be
used by identity thieves. Three main theories were proposed:
142 E.g., In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003);
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
143 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435
(1984).
'" Secondary copyright liability consists of vicarious liability and
contributory liability. Vicarious liability may be found where the wrongdoer
profits while failing to exercise a right to stop the wrongful activity. Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005).
Contributory liability occurs where a party is aware of a third party's wrongful
conduct and materially contributes to it. Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia
Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
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breach of contract, negligence and breach of fiduciary duty. All
would prove unavailing.
1. Breach of Contract
It has been suggested that breach of contract is the "best basis
on which to bring a [loss from data breach] claim."'45 However, a
breach of contract action is likely to leave the vast majority of
people with little or no meaningful -recourse. The FTC reports that
only about one half of identity theft victims "know how the person
who misused their personal information obtained it."'4 6 Even if the
information was obtained as a result of a data breach at an
organization with which the consumer had a contractual
relationship, it would be difficult or impossible to discover (let
alone prove to a legal certainty) which organization that was. Even
if the organization is identifiable, many organizations that possess
sensitive personal data do not have contractual relationships with
consumers at all,'47 since they have obtained the information
elsewhere.
Where a potential defendant can be identified and a contractual
relationship exists, the contract is unlikely to provide a basis for a
cause of action. Contracts between the individuals supplying the
information and those collecting the information are frequently
contracts of adhesion, drafted by the data collector. Any
antecedent attempt to negotiate the liability of a medical office,
university, or government entity for prospective damages
associated with a contemplated future data breach is likely to be
met with quizzical looks at best, and these entities have scant
incentive to include such provisions on their own.
2. Tort for Negligence
A second possible manner of recovery is to bring an action in
tort for negligence. Although some variation exists from state to
145 Picanso, supra note 94, at 377.
146 SYNOVATE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: IDENTITY THEFT SURVEY
REPORT 9 (Sept. 2003), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/synovatereport.pdf, at 9.
147 Picanso, supra note 94, at 377.
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state, a negligence action would generally require the plaintiff to
establish: (1) existence of a legal duty; (2) breach of that duty; (3)
causation of harm due to the breach; and (4) resulting damages.14 8
In data breach cases, all four of these elements may be difficult or
impossible to establish. Take the case of Randolph v. ING Life Ins.
& Annuity Co.,149 in which an ING employee laptop containing the
private information of 13,000 people was stolen during a
burglary.' The seven plaintiffs in the case alleged that they had or
would soon have to purchase credit reports and monitoring of their
credit for the indefinite future and that typical victims of identity
theft spend hundreds of hours and hundreds of dollars rectifying
their credit.'"' The plaintiffs did not, however, assert that they had
already been the victims of identity theft. Under these facts, the
court held that an increased risk of identity theft was not an "injury
in fact" and that plaintiffs lacked standing.'5 2 Injury in fact is the
"invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and
particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical."'53 Similarly, tort law allows recovery only if the
plaintiff has suffered injury to a "legally protected interest."'5 4
Since the plaintiffs in ING did not suffer injury to a legally
protected interest, they also would be unable to establish the
damages element of a negligence action.'
148 See, e.g., Pisciotta v. Old Nat'1 Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 635 (7th Cir. 2007);
Kahle v. Litton Loan Servicing Co., 486 F.Supp.2d 705, 706 (S.D. Ohio 2007);
Alcoa, Inc. v. Behringer, 235 S.W.3d 456, 459 (Tex. App. 2007).
149 486 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007).
's
0 Id. at 1.
'5' Id. at 2.
152 Id. at 5. Other courts have reached similar conclusions. In Ponder v.
Pfizer, Inc., a laptop of a Pfizer employee containing social security numbers of
17,000 employees was stolen. 522 F.Supp.2d 793 (M.D. La. 2007). The court
held that there is no injury until "the compromised data are actually used by a
third party to steal someone's identity." Id. at 4 n.5. See Key v. DSW Inc., 454
F. Supp. 2d 684 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (holding that plaintiff lacked standing).
153 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (internal
quotations omitted).
154 Gibson v. Trant, 58 S.W.3d 103, 111 (Tenn. 2001).
15 Although the two concepts are not identical, plaintiffs seeking to establish
injury-in-fact for purposes of standing must make a showing similar to (but
perhaps somewhat lower than) that required to establish the damages element of
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Some courts have found an injury-in-fact sufficient for
purposes of standing but not for purposes of establishing damages.
In the Seventh Circuit case of Pisciotta v. Old National Bancorp, 5 6
a sophisticated and malicious hacker obtained access to the private
information of tens of thousands of users of Old National
Bancorp's website.'" Like the plaintiffs in most data breach cases
brought to date, the plaintiffs in Pisciotta did not allege that any
members of their putative class had already been victims of
identity theft. Rather than dismiss the case for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, the court held that the plaintiffs had alleged an
injury in fact sufficient to confer standing' but ultimately
concluded that plaintiffs had not suffered a compensable injury.'
In reaching its decision, the court noted that the Indiana legislature
had enacted a data breach statute specifically in response to the
data breach at issue in the case. Although the statute was not
retroactive and thus did not apply to the case at bar, the court found
important the fact that the statute provided for no private right of
action and "impose[d] no duty to compensate affected
individuals."16 o Other courts have reached similar conclusions.''
a negligence action. See Kahle v. Litton Loan Servicing Co., 486 F. Supp. 2d
705, 712 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (noting that the standard for establishing standing is
not the standard for establishing damages in a tort action); Key v. DSW Inc.,
454 F. Supp. 2d 684 (S.D. Ohio 2006) ("By dismissing all of Plaintiffs claims
for lack of standing [because Plaintiff failed to allege that she suffered an injury-
in-fact], the Court also finds that Plaintiff has not alleged cognizable damages
sufficient to state a contract, negligence . .. or, breach of fiduciary duty claim.").
156 499 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2007).
I5 7 d. at 631.
Id. at 634.
Id. at 640.
160 Id. at 637.
161 See, e.g., Shafran v. Harley Davidson, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22494,
at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2008) (noting that all courts considering the issue of
whether the time and money spent guarding against identity theft is a
compensable injury have answered in the negative); Guin v. Brazos Higher
Educ. Serv. Corp., 2006 WL 288483, at *4 & *6 (D. Minn. Feb. 7, 2006)
(holding that where laptop containing private customer data was stolen from the
home of one of defendant's employees, defendant was not liable, given that it
complied with the relevant provisions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and had
not breached any duty of care; furthermore, an increased risk of identity theft
was not sufficient to constitute an injury under a negligence standard.); Kahle v.
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Harm of the type sustained by victims of data breaches should
be compensable, even where identity theft cannot be established.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts states: "One whose legally
protected interests have been endangered by the tortious conduct of
another is entitled to recover for expenditures reasonably made ...
in a reasonable effort to avert the harm threatened."' This
rationale was applied in Kuhn v. Capital One Financial
Corporation,6 3 where eighteen fraudulent accounts were opened in
Kuhn's name after her personal information was compromised."*
Although she was not held responsible for any charges on those
accounts, the court found a compensable injury in the "time
spent . . . seeking to prevent or undo the harm,"1'6 citing the
provision contained in the Restatement.
The proposition that preventing future harm should be
compensable finds analogous support in the contractual duty to
mitigate. In general, damages in breach of contract cases are only
recoverable to the extent that the non-breaching party could not
have avoided them by taking reasonable measures.' 6  This
suggests that where a contractual relationship exists between an
individual and a data collector and that data collector experiences a
data breach that violates its contractual obligations with respect to
the data, the individual would only be able to recover for damages
that could not have been avoided by undertaking reasonable
mitigation measures. If credit monitoring and other costs are not
compensable, then this leaves the individual in a Catch-22. If she
takes no preventative action and identity theft later occurs, then the
data collector can argue that she should be unable to recover for
those losses that she could have prevented by taking reasonable
measures. If she takes preventative action, then she is precluded
Litton Loan Servicing Co., 486 F. Supp. 2d 705 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (finding that
"credit monitoring costs are not sufficient injury where no fraud has occurred"
in case where hard drives containing information on 229,501 former customers
were stolen); Stollenwerk v. Tri-West Healthcare Alliance, 2005 WL 2465906
(D. Ariz. Sept. 6, 2005).
162 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 919 (1979).
163 2006 WL 3007931 (Appeals Ct. of Mass. Oct. 23, 2006).
1 Id. at *1.
165 Id. at *3 (internal quotations omitted).
166 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 (1981).
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from recovering the costs of that action from the data collector. In
contrast, contract law generally allows for the recovery of
incidental costs incurred by the non-breaching party to prevent
anticipated losses: "Inasmuch as the law denies recovery for losses
that can be avoided by reasonable effort and expense, justice
requires that the risks incident to such effort should be carried by
the party whose wrongful conduct makes them necessary."'
Causation may be equally difficult to establish. Hundreds of
thousands of organizations-both public and private, domestic and
foreign-may possess the private information of a given
individual. Even if the individual has already experienced identity
theft and is able to establish damages, she will face the nearly
insurmountable challenge of proving that a given data breach was
causally connected to the loss.'6 8 Even where only two
organizations containing an individual's private data have
experienced data breaches, it may be equally likely that the thief
obtained the data from either source. Thus, the plaintiff would be
unable to prove causation by even the minimal "preponderance of
the evidence" standard.'69 In reality, creative thieves have
innumerable options for obtaining private data, including phishing
schemes, rifling through trash bins, examining public records, and
simply buying information outright from a data broker for a
nominal fee.' Therefore, even if a data breach victim could prove
that her information was compromised by a particular defendant
and later misused by a particular identity thief, she would have no
167 Brandon & Tibbs v. George Kevorkian Accountancy Corp., 226
Cal.App.3d 442, 461 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (citing 5 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN
ON CONTRACTS § 1044 (1964)).
168 Picanso, supra note 94, at 380 ("Many security breaches and instances of
identity theft are never solved, leaving injured parties unable to show with
absolute certainty that a particular security breach caused their harm.").
169 See Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 404 (9th Cir.
1996) (preponderance of the evidence standard requires party to prove that her
claim is "more likely than not").
170 Jonathan Krim, Social Security Data Still Ripe for Picking, SEATTLE
TIMES, Apr. 17, 2005, at El (noting that social security numbers may be
purchased online for as little as $35).
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way of connecting the two events with any measurable certainty,"'
except in the unlikely event that the thief was caught and
confessed.
3. Tort for Breach of a Fiduciary Duty
A third possible manner of recovery is the tort for breach of a
fiduciary duty. Using the lack of standing and the traditional
"economic loss" rule'72 theories for denying recovery advanced
above, courts have not yet accepted breach of a fiduciary duty as a
viable theory for recovery in data security breach cases."'
Furthermore, courts have been reluctant to assign fiduciary status
to individuals engaged in commercial transactions.'74
Notwithstanding the current state of the law in this area, the
fiduciary liability theory has been largely untested and should
1' See Walters v. DHL Express, 2006 WL 1314132, at *5 (C.D. Ill. May 12,
2006) ("[D]amages would be based upon speculation as to ... [whether the
identity theft was] caused by Defendant's actions, rather than anyone
else's . . . .").
172 See Derek A. Bishop, No Harm No Foul: Limits on Damages Awards for
Individuals Subject to a Data Breach, 4 SHIDLER J.L. COM. & TECH. 12 (2008)
(noting that traditional tort law will not allow recovery for economic loss
without evidence of physical harm and that contract law is better suited for such
claims); see also Banknorth NA v. BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 2d
206 (M.D. Pa. 2006) (dismissing negligence claim of plaintiff credit card issuer
against defendant retailer for the cost of reissuing credit cards after data breach
of defendant, as the economic loss rule did not allow recovery absent physical
harm).
'" See, e.g., Shafran v. Harley Davidson, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22494,
at *7 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2008) (without actual injury, fiduciary duty claim
must be dismissed); Key v. DSW Inc., 454 F.Supp.2d 684, 685 (S.D. Ohio
2006) ("By dismissing all of Plaintiffs claims for lack of standing, the Court
also finds that Plaintiff has not alleged cognizable damages sufficient to state a
. . . breach of fiduciary duty claim."); Ponder v. Pfizer, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 2d
793 (M.D. La. 2007) (concluding that data exposure, without more, is not a
compensable injury and granting a motion to dismiss all claims despite
allegation of fiduciary relationship).
174 See PulseCard, Inc. v. Discover Card Services, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 1488,
1493 (D. Kan. 1996) ("[F]iduciary obligations should be extended reluctantly to
commercial or business transactions."); Terra Venture Inc. v. JDN Real Estate-
Overland Park, L.P., 443 F.3d 1240, 1246 (10th Cir. 2006) ("We do not presume
the existence of fiduciary duties and extend them to commercial transactions,
where parties deal at arm's length for their mutual profit.").
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therefore be considered further.'" Most plaintiffs in data breach
cases have not even alleged fiduciary duty."' Where fiduciary
duty has been alleged, it has been pursued half-heartedly by
plaintiffs and treated with little or no discussion by the courts."'
To be viable, a plaintiff would have to establish that entrusting the
data collector with personal information, especially one's social
security number, springs into existence a quasi-fiduciary
relationship that is more similar to an agency.'7 than to an arm's-
length relationship. As a fiduciary, it could be argued a data
collector entrusted with personal identifiable information would
assume the duty to act for the benefit of the consumer upon matters
within the scope of the relationship."' Specifically, this duty
would include loyalty, trust, and confidentiality-acting in the
consumer's best interest to prevent unauthorized access to and use
of the confidential information.' The duty of confidentiality is
analogous to that arising from the attorney-client or physician-
patient relationships. Those relationships certainly require the
1 See generally Brandon Faulkner, Hacking into Data Breach Notification
Laws, 59 FLA. L. REV. 1097, 1122 (2007) (advocating for the imposition of a
fiduciary duty on data aggregators).
'
76 See, e.g., TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (2000); Randolph v. ING Life
Insurance and Annuity Co., 486 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 2007); Stollenwerk v.
Tri-West Healthcare Alliance, No. Civ. 03-0185PHXSRB, 2005 WL 2465906 at
4 (D. Ariz. Sept. 6, 2005); Bell v. Axciom Corp., No. 4:06CV00485-WRW,
2006 WL 2850042 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 3, 2006); Spikings v. Cost Plus Inc., No. CV
06-8125-JFW (AJWx), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44214 (C.D. Cal. May 25, 2007).
177 See, e.g., Guin v. Brazos Higher Education Serv. Corp., Inc., No. Civ. 05-
668 RHK/JSM, 2006 WL 288483, at *2 (D. Minn. Feb. 7, 2006) (plaintiff
voluntarily dismisses fiduciary duty claim); Forbes v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
420 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1020 n.2 (D. Minn. 2006) (plaintiff does not pursue
fiduciary duty claim); Key v. DSW Inc., 454 F. Supp. 2d 684, 685 (S.D. Ohio
2006) ("By dismissing all of Plaintiffs claims for lack of standing, the Court
also finds that Plaintiff has not alleged cognizable damages sufficient to state a
... breach of fiduciary duty claim.").
178 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2006) ("An agent has a
fiduciary duty to act loyally for the principal's benefit in all matters connected
with the agency relationship.").
179 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 cmt. a (1979).
180 See id. at § 874 ("One standing in a fiduciary relation with another is
subject to liability to the other for harm resulting from a breach of duty imposed
by the relation.").
34 [VOL. 10: 1
Data Collection Practices
physician and attorney to take whatever steps are necessary to
protect the confidentiality (and unauthorized access and release) of
client or patient information."' Similarly, data collectors should
take whatever steps are necessary to safeguard the security of a
consumer's personal information.
That a fiduciary duty exists (or should be held to exist)
between a data collector and the individuals whose data is the
subject of collection is a proposition that already finds support in
current state and federal law. In a data breach case involving the
failure to safeguard information of union members, the Michigan
Court of Appeals proclaimed that "society has a right to expect that
personal information divulged in confidence ... will be guarded
with the utmost care."l82 At the federal level, both the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act (GLB)"' and the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (HIPAA)184 include provisions designed to
protect confidential information.' The provisions of GLB apply
8 See MODEL RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2007) ("A lawyer shall
not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client
gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry
out the representation or the disclosure" is reasonably believed to be necessary
to prevent death, substantial bodily harm, or crime, or in certain other limited
circumstances.); AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS CODE OF PROF.
CONDUCT R. 301 (1999) (requiring that a member in public practice cannot
divulge confidential client information without the specific consent of the
client). State rules also prohibit such disclosures. See, e.g., N.Y. BD. OF
REGENTS R. 29.1(b)(8) (2006), available at http://www.op.nysed.gov/
part29.htm (Unprofessional conduct includes the "revealing of personally
identifiable facts, data or information obtained in a professional capacity without
the prior consent of the patient or client, except as authorized or required by
law.").
182 Bell v. Michigan Council 25, No. 246684, 2005 WL 356306, at *3 (Mich.
Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2005) (limiting its holding to "where defendant knew
confidential information was leaving its premises" and failed to implement any
security procedures).
183 Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 6801-6810).
184 Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
185 See 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2006) ("It is the policy of Congress that each
financial institution has an affirmative and continuing obligation to respect the
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to financial institutions-including, but not limited to, banks,
credit unions, mortgage companies, insurance companies, and
brokerages-that offer financial goods and services.16  GLB
provides that a financial institution must obtain customers' consent
before disclosing or sharing their personal identifiable
information.' HIPAA applies to health care providers,
clearinghouses, health plans including those offered by employers,
and to those offering or providing services that include the
electronic transmission of personal health information.' The
regulations promulgated pursuant to HIPAA similarly require that
the consent of the patient must be obtained before personal health
information can be released or shared.'89
As with the contract and negligence theories discussed above,
the lack of actual damages could be an obstacle for the plaintiffs
success in an action in tort for breach of a fiduciary duty against
the data collector.' Courts have yet to award damages for time,
money, and effort expended by data breach victims in attempting
to prevent potential future economic losses including those that
could result from identity theft,"' deeming the claim for these
privacy of its customers and to protect the security and confidentiality of those
customers' nonpublic personal information.").
18 15 U.S.C. § 6805(a)(1) - (7) (2006).
18 15 U.S.C. § 6802 (2006). GLB provides for an opt-out notice requirement
which puts the onus on the customer to refuse to allow the financial institution to
disclose or share personal information. Id. at § 6802(b).
1842 U.S.C. § 1320d-1(a) (2008); see also 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2008).
45 C.F.R. §§ 164.506, 508 (2008).
o9 0 See supra Part III.B.2.
19' See Walters v. DHL Express, No. 05-1255, 2006 WL 1314132, at *5 (C.D.
Ill. May 12, 2006) (dismissing claim for damages for an increased risk of
identity theft as speculative); Guin v. Brazos Higher Educ. Serv. Corp., Inc., No.
Civ. 05-668 RHK/JSM, 2006 WL 288483, at *5 (D. Minn. Feb. 7, 2006)
(rejecting claim that an increased risk of identity theft constituted damages,
where a laptop containing sensitive information was stolen but there was no
evidence of any identity theft); Stollenwerk v. Tri-West Healthcare Alliance,
No. Civ. 03-0185PHXSRB, 2005 WL 2465906, at *4 (D. Ariz. Sept. 6, 2005)
(dismissing case where hard drives containing personal information were stolen
from defendant's facility, reasoning that plaintiffs must, at a minimum, establish
"1) significant exposure of sensitive personal information, 2) a significantly
increased risk of identity fraud as a result of that exposure and 3) the necessity
36 [VOL. 10: 1
Data Collection Practices
damages to be speculative.19 2 Given the plethora of data breaches
that have occurred and are increasingly occurring,'93 legislation
comparable to GLB and HIPAA is needed to strengthen security
and protection of personal information in the possession of data
brokers, with liability attaching for data breaches even where
identity theft cannot be proven.
A prime example of the need for new and more stringent
legislation is the case of United States v. ChoicePoint.'94 Since
1997, ChoicePoint has been selling an enormous variety of
personal information including names, social security numbers,
birth dates, bank and credit card account numbers and credit
histories, police records, and claims histories.'9 5 Its customers
include entities in both the public and private sectors. In 2005,
ChoicePoint reported that it had inadvertently sold the personal
information of 145,000 consumers to a group of identity thieves."'
As a result, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) filed a
complaint'9 7 in which it alleged that ChoicePoint had violated
and effectiveness of credit monitoring in detecting, treating and/or preventing
identity fraud.").
192 See, e.g., Randolph v. ING Life Ins. & Annuity Co., 486 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8
(D.D.C. 2007) (declining to award damages when theft of defendant's laptop
computer exposed plaintiff's data, as any claim of damages was "mere
speculation"); see also Kahle v. Litton Loan Servicing LP, 486 F. Supp. 2d 705
(S.D. Ohio 2007) (holding that damages for time and money spent in obtaining
credit monitoring, absent proof of actual unauthorized use, were speculative).
193 Krebs, supra note 74.
194 United States v. ChoicePoint, Inc., No. 1:06-cv-00198-JTC (N.D. Ga. Feb.
15, 2006).
19s For more information about ChoicePoint and a description of the data they
collect and provide, see ChoicePoint.com, Overview, http://www.choicepoint
.com/about/overview.html (last visited July 7, 2008).
1
9 6 See Matt Hines, ChoicePoint Data Theft Widens to 145,000 People,
ZDNET NEWS, Feb. 18, 2005, http://news.zdnet.com/2100-1009_22-
5582144.html. The number was later raised to 163,000. Jon Brodkin,
ChoicePoint Details Data Breach Lessons, PC WORLD, Jun 11, 2007,
http://www.pcworld.com/article/132795/choicepointdetails-data-breach-lesso
ns.html.
1 Complaint for Civil Penalties, Permanent Injunction, and Other Equitable
Relief, United States v. ChoicePoint, No. 106-CV-0198 (Jan. 30, 2006),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/choicepoint/choicepoint.shtm.
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various sections of the Fair Credit Reporting Actl98 and that these
violations also constituted unfair or deceptive business practices
under the FTC Act.'" ChoicePoint entered into a settlement with
the FTC, the terms of which included the payment of $10 million
in civil penalties and $5 million in consumer redress.200
ChoicePoint also agreed to comprehensive security audits every
two years until the year 2026 and to conduct site visits of its
subscribers to verify their authenticity.20 1
It is interesting to note Senator Patrick Leahy's (D. Vermont)
pertinent comment regarding the ChoicePoint incident: "Their
actions were an irresponsible violation of a fiduciary relationship
they have with their customers."202 While ChoicePoint might be
reluctant to concede any legally binding fiduciary relationship, its
mission statement provides a subtle acknowledgement of the
security risks inherent in its business: "We strive to create a safer
and more secure society through the responsible use of
information."203
'9 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §1681b (2008) (prohibiting a consumer reporting
agency from providing consumer reports except for legitimate and permissible
purposes); 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a) (requiring a consumer reporting agency to
employ reasonable efforts to verify the identity of its subscribers and to establish
the uses for which the information sought is to be used).
'99 See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2008).
200 Stipulated Final Judgment and Order for Civil Penalties, In re ChoicePoint,
No. 106-CV-0198, at 4 & 17 (Feb. 10, 2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os
/caselist/choicepoint/0523069stip.pdf; Jaikumar Vijayan, FTC Imposes $10M
Fine Against ChoicePoint for Data Breach, COMPUTERWORLD, Jan. 26, 2006,
available at http://www.computerworld.com/securitytopics/security/story/
0,10801,108069,00.html.
201 Stipulated Final Judgment and Order for Civil Penalties, In re ChoicePoint,
No. 106-CV-0198, at 6, 16-17 (Feb. 10, 2006), available at http://www.
ftc.gov/os/caselist/choicepoint/0523069stip.pdf.
202 Grant Gross, Senators Rip into ChoicePoint, Bank of America on Data
Losses, COMPUTERWORLD, Mar. 11, 2005, http://www.computerworld.com/
securitytopics/security/story/0,10801,100334,00.html?source=x73.
203 ChoicePoint.com, Vision and Mission, http://www.choicepoint.com/about/
overview/visionmission.html (last visited July 7, 2008).
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C. Government Action Highlights Problems and Points Toward
Solutions
While the front line of data collecting entities has so far done
relatively little to alter its data collection practices, there is reason
to believe that meaningful change is just around the corner. The
casual and unrestrained collection, use, transfer, sale, display, and
disclosure of social security numbers has received increasingly
vocal criticism and-due to its connection with identity theft-
attracted attention at the highest levels of government. The
Government Accountability Office has generated over twenty
reports since 2002 directly addressing the use (and misuse) of
social security numbers and generally recommending reform.20
The FTC has testified before the House Committee on Ways and
Means, urging "comprehensive reviews of both private and public
sector usage of SSNs."205 Consumers Union, the publisher of the
widely-respected Consumer Reports magazine, has urged states to
adopt its model legislation which would impose sensible
restrictions on the use of social security numbers.206 Most notably,
in 2006 President Bush issued an executive order establishing a
204E.g., U.S. GAO, Pub. No. GAO-06-495, Social Security Numbers: Internet
Resellers Provide Few Full SSNs, but Congress Should Consider Enacting
Standards for Truncating SSNs (May 17, 2006); U.S. GAO, Pub. No. GAO-06-
238, Social Security Numbers: Stronger Protections Needed When Contractors
Have Access to SSNs (Jan. 23, 2006); U.S. GAO, Pub. No. GAO-05-1016T,
Social Security Numbers: Federal and State Laws Restrict Use of SSNs, Yet
Gaps Remain (Sept. 15, 2005); U.S. GAO, Pub. No. GAO-04-1099T, Social
Security Numbers: Use Is Widespread and Protections Vary in Private and
Public Sectors (Sept. 28, 2004). A search of the GAO website for the term
"social security numbers" revealed an impressive eighty-three reports since
1978, with sixty-three of these since 1995.
205 Fed. Trade Comm'n, Protecting the Privacy of the Social Security Number
from Identity Theft, Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission,
Subcommittee on Social Security of the House Ways and Means Committee,
June 21, 2007, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/testimony/P065409socsectest
.pdf.
206 COnsumersUnion.org, Model State SSN Protection Law, http://www.
consumersunion.org/pub/core_financialservices/004800.html (last visited June
6, 2008).
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task force to address the problem of identity theft.207 Finally, both
state legislatures and Congress have begun to answer these
collective calls for reform by enacting legislation aimed at the core
problems of indiscriminate data collection and, more commonly,
social security number misuse.
1. State Notice ofBreach Statutes
States have responded to the incidents at ChoicePoint, TJX,
BJ's, DSW, and others by enacting statutes that require consumer
notification in the case of a data breach. At least forty-four states
have enacted some type of breach notification law to date,208
imposing a number of breach-related costs on businesses. In
addition to the direct costs of mailing letters and responding to
consumer inquiries, businesses face an increased risk of litigation
and the discomfort of public embarrassment.20 9 At the same time,
the hodgepodge of state law requirements is unnecessarily
confusing and has led to calls for federal action.2 10 Although there
are bills pending in the U.S. Congress that would require
notification upon breach,21 ' none has yet passed.
2. State Social Security Number Statutes
Since 2001, states across the country have also been busily
enacting legislation that restricts the ability of entities to publicly
207 Exec. Order No. 13402, 71 Fed. Reg. 27,945 (May 10, 2006). The task
force included the United States Attorney General (who was to serve as chair),
the Chairman of the FTC (who would serve as co-chair), the Commissioner of
Social Security, and the Secretaries of the Treasury, Commerce, Health and
Human Services, Veteran's Affairs, and Homeland Security departments, among
others.
208 See Nat'l Conf. of State Legislatures, State Security Breach Notification
Laws, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/cip/priv/breachlaws.htm (last visited
Aug. 1, 2008); see also Notice of Security Breach State Laws, CONSUMERS
UNION, Aug. 21, 2007, http://www.consumersunion.org/campaigns/Breach
laws May05.pdf.
209 Cost of a Data Breach, PONEMON INSTITUTE, Oct. 2006, at 2,
http://www.computerworld.com/pdfs/PGPAnnual StudyPDF.pdf (last visited
Aug. 1, 2008).210 See Faulkner, supra note 175, at 1107.
211 E.g., Notification of Risk to Personal Data Act, S. 239, 1 10th Cong.
(2007); Federal Agency Data Breach Protection Act, H.R. 2124, 110th Cong.
(2007).
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display and use the social security number. For example,
California law now prohibits "a person or entity" from
"[p]ublicly ... display[ing] ... an individual's social security
number," "[p]rinting an individual's social security number on any
card required for the individual to access products or services
provided by the person or entity" or "[r]equir[ing] an individual to
transmit his or her social security number over the Internet, unless
the connection is secure or the social security number is
encrypted."2 12 Since January 1, 2008, New York has prohibited
most private entities from making social security numbers
available to the public, from printing them on any "card or tag
required for the individual to access products, services or benefits,"
and from requiring individuals to transfer social security numbers
unencrypted over the Internet.2 13 More than twenty other states
now have similar laws on the books, 214 and a few states have gone
even further in protecting consumers. Minnesota and New
Mexico, for example, require entities that do choose to use social
security numbers to restrict access to employees who need such
access to perform job duties.2 15
Unfortunately, legislation in almost all states is riddled with
flaws and exceptions. Michigan, for example, allows the public
display of up to four sequential digits of the social security
number, but does not specify which four.2 16 This leaves open the
possibility that publicly available records could be combined to
create complete social security numbers, a problem identified in a
212 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.85(a) (West 2008). Cf COLO. REv. STAT. § 6-1-
715(1)(c) (West 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-470(b)(3) (West 2008); GA.
CODE ANN. § 10-1-393.8(a)(2) (West 2008); HAW. REv. STAT. § 487J-2(3)
(2008); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2RR(a)(3) (West 2008); MD. CODE ANN.,
COM. LAW § 14-3402(a)(3) (West 2008); MICH. Comp. LAWS § 445.83(1)(d)
(West 2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-164(5) (West 2008); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW
§ 399-dd(2)(c) (McKinney 2008).
213 N.Y. GEN. Bus. L. § 399-dd(2) (McKinney 2008).
214 See Notice of Security Breach State Laws, CONSUMERSUNION.ORG, Aug.
21, 2007, http://www.consumersunion.org/campaigns/BreachlawsMay05.pdf,
at n.7.
215 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.59(a)(7)(b) (West 2008). Cf N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 57-12B-3(D) (West 2008).
216 MICH. COMP. LAWS§ 445.83 (West 2008).
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2006 General Accountability Office Report, which recommended
federal legislation to standardize truncation practices.2 17 Similarly,
New Mexico's statute allows sufficient leeway for entities to make
publicly available any eight of the nine digits in an individual's
social security number. 218  Furthermore, government entities are
granted exceptions under some state statutes, 219 and even if no
statutory exception is available, a government entity may be able
to take refuge under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.2 20 In any
event, state attorneys general may be reluctant to bring an action
against an arm of the state for continuing longstanding data
collection practices. Some states prohibit the use of the social
security number as a primary identifier of an individual's account,
but apparently allow its use as a secondary or higher-order
identifier.22 1 Most states exempt public records, severely impairing
the statutes' prophylactic effects.222
Many of these state statutes are also riddled with exceptions for
and limits on remedies against private entities. Businesses may
continue to share social security numbers with affiliates and
multiple levels of contractors, in some cases with explicit statutory
217 U.S. GAO, Pub. No. GAO-06-495, Social Security Numbers: Internet
Resellers Provide Few Full SSNs, but Congress Should Consider Enacting
Standards for Truncating SSNs (May 17, 2006).
218 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12B-4(A)(1) (West 2008).
219 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.59(a) & subdiv. 5 (West 2008)
(excluding government entities other than state colleges and universities); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 40, § 173.1(A)(2) (West 2008) (excluding the state and political
subdivisions thereof); 74 PA. STAT. ANN. § 201(e)-(f) (West 2008); TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 35.58(b) (Vernon 2008).
220 See, e.g., McNichols v. Commonwealth, 804 A.2d 1264, 1267 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2002) ("Wrongful discharge ... is not one of the enumerated
exceptions [to sovereign immunity].").
221 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.59(a)(6) (West 2008).
222 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.85(c) (West 2008); cf COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-
715(4) (West 2008) (exempting public records from the statute's purview);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 487J-2(b)(1 1) (2008); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2RR(d)
(West 2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.83(g)(iv) (West 2008); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 325E.59 subdiv. 4 (West 2008); Mo. REV. STAT. § 407.1355(4); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 57-12B-3(B)(3) (West 2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-443.2(D)
(West 2008).
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blessing.223 In every state except Rhode Island and Maine, entities
may use the social security number for "internal verification or
administrative purposes,"224 which would appear to condone the
continued use of the number as a password. Penalties for violation
of these statutes tend to be small. 2 5 Grandfather provisions allow
entities engaged in use of social security numbers to continue that
use even after the legislation becomes effective.226 The right to sue
is sometimes limited to state attorneys general or other public
bodies, leaving consumers without direct recourse.22 7
223 HAW. REV. STAT. § 487J-2(b)(8) (2008).
224 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.85(b) (West 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-470(d)
(West 2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-393.8(b)(3) (West 2008); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 487J-2(b)(9) (2008); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2RR(c) (West 2008);
KAN. STAT. ANN § 75-3520(b)(3)(B) (West 2008); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW
§ 14-3402(b)(3) (West 2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.59 subdiv. 3 (West
2008); Mo. REV. STAT. § 407.1355(3); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-164(b) (West
2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12B-4(B)(2)(c) (West 2008); N.Y. GEN. Bus.
LAW § 399-dd(3) (McKinney 2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-62(b)(2) (West
2008); OKLA. STAT. tit. 40, § 173.1(C) (West 2008); 74 PA. STAT. ANN. § 201(d)
(West 2008).
225 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-470(e) (West 2008) (capping liability at
$100 for first-time violators); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 4-86-107(f) (West 2008)
(capping liability at $250 per violation); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-1373(I) (2008)
(capping liability at $500 dollars); 74 PA. STAT. ANN. § 201(g) (West 2008)
(capping liability at $500 for first time violators); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-48-17
(2008) (imposing criminal penalties of up to $500); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE
ANN. 35.58(b) (Vernon 2008) ($500); KAN. STAT. ANN § 75-3520(c) (West
2008) (capping liability at $1000 per violation). In contrast, New York law
provides for penalties of up to $100,000 for first time violations where multiple
violations result from a single act or incident. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 399-dd(6)
(McKinney 2008).
2 26 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-1373(B) (2008); COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-
715(2) (West 2008); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2RR(b) (West 2008); MD. CODE
ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3403 (West 2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.83(3)(b)
(West 2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12B-4(B) (West 2008); 74 PA. STAT. ANN.
§ 20 1(c) (West 2008).
227 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-1373(H) (2008); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 4-
86-107(f) (West 2008) (authorizing the attorney general to bring suit); N.Y.
GEN. Bus. LAW § 399-dd(6) (McKinney 2008). One exception is Rhode Island,
which allows consumer-plaintiffs to recover damages, attorney fees and costs.
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-48-17(c) (2008).
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On the other hand, Kansas, Rhode Island, Maine, and New
Mexico have gone beyond the use and display restrictions
characteristic of most state statutes and have directly attacked the
foundational problem of indiscriminate social security number
collection. Both Rhode Island and Maine have enacted concise
statutes that prohibit conditioning the receipt of goods or services
on the provision of a social security number.228 The statutes in
these states contain few exceptions and probably constitute the
most consumer-favorable legislation to date.
The attempts in Kansas and New Mexico, while having
positive attributes, suffer from significant shortcomings. Kansas
limits the ability of private entities to ask an individual for her
social security number "unless such number is necessary for [the
entity's] normal course of business and there is a specific use for
such number for which no other identifying number may be
used."229 However, as in most states, the provision does not apply
with respect to "internal verification or administrative purposes,"230
an exception that would seem to nearly swallow the rule. The
Kansas legislation attempts to plug the hole created by the public
record exemption by providing that documents available for public
inspection may not contain both a social security number and other
personal information such as name and address.23 ' Still, court
documents and records of deeds are exempted;232 despite well-
meaning intentions, the legislation essentially directs identity
thieves to locations where social security numbers can still be
228 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-48-17 (2008); 10 MAINE REV. STAT. § 1272-B (2008).
229 KAN. STAT. ANN § 75-3520(b) (West 2008).
230 KAN. STAT. ANN § 75-3520(b)(3)(B) (West 2008); cf CONN. GEN. STAT. §
42-470(d) (West 2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-393.8(b)(3) (West 2008); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 487J-2(b)(9) (2008); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2RR(c) (West
2008); KAN. STAT. ANN § 75-3520(b)(3)(B) (West 2008); MD. CODE ANN.,
COM. LAW § 14-3402(b)(3) (West 2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.59 subdiv.
3 (West 2008); Mo. REv. STAT. § 407.1355(3) (West 2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
56:8-164(b) (West 2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12B-4(B)(2)(c) (West 2008);
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 399-dd(3) (McKinney 2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-
62(b)(2) (West 2008); OKLA. STAT. tit. 40, § 173.1(C) (West 2008); 74 PA.
STAT. ANN. § 201(d) (West 2008).
231 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-3520(a)(1) (West 2008).
232 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-3520(b)(2) (West 2008).
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found.233  Actions under the Kansas law may be brought by
"aggrieved" individuals, 234 making it unclear whether proof of
harm is required. As discussed above, proof of harm with respect
to data exposure can be problematic.2 35
New Mexico similarly prohibits businesses from "requir[ing] a
consumer's social security number as a condition for the consumer
to lease or purchase products, goods or services from the
business." 236  However, this broad protection is undermined by
allowing the exception of consent.237 This means that businesses
may still require the completion of forms that request the social
security number. Even though consumers are not obligated to
provide it, only those who are savvy and bold enough to challenge
the status quo by leaving the social security number field blank
would benefit. Only New York-which, unlike New Mexico, does
not prohibit the collection of social security numbers in the first
instance-has recognized this type of problem and proactively
addressed it. Entities in New York cannot bypass the statute's
requirements by including waiver provisions in their contracts with
customers; such purported waivers are statutorily determined to be
against public policy and therefore void.238
Some exceptions to the prohibition on social security number
use are clearly warranted. Entities deciding whether or not to
extend credit, for example, must have a way of reliably locating an
individual's credit history. Employers and others have legitimate
needs to conduct background checks in order to ensure a safe work
environment. With the few exceptions noted above, however, state
legislation so far enacted contains exceptions so numerous and
233 See Christopher Lee, GAO: Social Security Numbers Vulnerable, WASH.
POST, Nov. 12, 2004, at A23 ("Identity thieves can snare Social Security
numbers from a potpourri of public records, especially those maintained by state
and local governments . .
234 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-3520(c) (West 2008); cf N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §
399-dd(6) (McKinney 2008) (proof of damages not required).
235 See supra Part II.B.
236 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12B-3(A) (West 2008).2 7 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12B-3(C) (West 2008); cf OKLA. STAT. tit. 40, §
173.1(C) (West 2008) (providing a written consent exception for employees
with respect to their employers).
238 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 399-dd(5) (McKinney 2008).
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substantial as to eviscerate their raison d'dtre. In short, the statutes
tend to be more form than substance. With alluring names like the
"Social Security Number Privacy Act,"239 they appear to be aimed
at pacifying those concerned about identity theft, but the provisions
themselves fail to reflect the fortitude needed to produce
meaningful change.
State laws restricting social security number use exist in other
contexts as well. New York, for example, prohibits educational
institutions from using the social security number on student
rosters and identification cards.24 0 Arizona and Rhode Island
similarly prohibit universities from assigning either faculty or
student identification numbers that are identical to social security
numbers.2 4' Texas restricts the use of social security numbers
provided to merchants in connection with merchandise returns, and
requires that records containing the number collected for this
purpose be destroyed within six months after collection.2 42
While these state laws shed light on the damaging misuse of
social security numbers, they largely fail to address the core
problem: the use of the social security number as a skeleton key
by which the consumer-or an identity thief-can access multiple
accounts. Most states that have enacted social security number use
legislation prohibit the use of social security numbers to access
websites, unless a password is also required to access the site.243
Because these restrictions only apply to account access via the
Internet, however, they leave open the possibility that an identity
thief could use a social security number to access an account by
telephone, fax, letter, in-person communication, or any other
manner that does not involve the Internet. Moreover, an identity
239 See, e.g., Social Security Number Privacy Act, 2004 Mich. Pub. Acts 454
(effective Mar. 1, 2005); Social Security Privacy Act, Acts 2005 Md. Laws c.
521 (effective Jan. 1, 2006); The Consumer Empowerment and Identity Theft
Prevention Act of 2006, 2006 R.I. Pub. Laws c. 226 (effective June 29, 2006).240 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2-b (McKinney 2008).
241 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-1823 (2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-38-5.1
(2008).242 TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 35.581 (Vernon 2008).
243 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1373(A)(4) (2008); N.Y. GEN. Bus.
LAW § 399-dd(2)(d) (McKinney 2008).
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thief in possession of a social security number also would be
halfway to unlocking accounts over the Internet, lacking only the
password. Similarly, the use of truncated social security numbers
as passwords is a specious tactic that suffers from a serious flaw.
If entities provide account access based upon only the last four
digits (or other variant) of a social security number, this does little
to thwart criminal activity-the thief now needs only four digits to
access the account instead of nine. A much better system would
encourage the use of identifiers that are unique to a given
organization, so that if the numerical key fell into the wrong hands,
it would facilitate access to only one account rather than all
accounts. Moreover, using a number other than the social security
number would mean that it would be relatively easy to change that
number if necessary, just as one can change locks when a physical
key is lost or stolen.
3. Federal Statutes
Even if the aforementioned shortcomings of the state statutes
were rectified, regulation at the state level has two main
disadvantages. First, multiple inconsistent systems of compliance
can be confusing and expensive. Because organizations normally
maintain only one website that serves customers in multiple states,
website interfaces must comply with all of the various state
requirements. Similarly, since paper solicitations are often mailed
across state lines, entities must either tailor multiple solicitations to
individual states or develop a single solicitation that meets the
requirements of all of the states.244 Second, because widely stored
information is only as secure as its most vulnerable point of access,
social security number confidentiality is limited by the state with
the weakest laws.
Acknowledging the nationwide scope of the problem, Congress
has considered a number of major social security number
protection bills.245 Although none of these has passed, more
244 Krebs, supra note 74 (quoting a spokesman of an organization that
experienced a data breach: "More time was spent researching various state laws
than trying to figure out how to remedy the problem.").
245 See, e.g., Safeguarding Social Security Numbers Act, S. 2915, 110th Cong.
(2008); Social Security Number Misuse Prevention Act, S. 238, 110th Cong.
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limited measures have succeeded.246 In 1974, Congress enacted the
Privacy Act, which prohibited "any Federal, State or local
government agency from denying any individual any right, benefit,
or privilege provided by law because of such individual's refusal to
disclose his social security account number."2 47 However, as with
recent state legislation, the social security number provision was
primarily symbolic; due to its substantial exceptions, it had little
effect on the collection and use of social security numbers.2 48
Another relatively narrow federal provision dictates that social
security numbers obtained by government officials pursuant to
laws enacted on or after October 1, 1990, must be maintained as
confidential and not disclosed.2 49  Prior to 1994, many states
generated substantial revenue from selling social security numbers
and other personal information that was required to be provided by
driver's license applicants.25 0 The Driver's Privacy Protection Act
of 1994 ended this lucrative practice by restricting the sharing or
sale of information collected by states when issuing driver's
licenses.25' Ten years later, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act banned the display of social security numbers on
(2008); Social Security Number Fraud and Identity Theft Prevention Act, S.
699, 110th Cong. (2008); The Social Security Number Privacy and Identity
Theft Prevention Act, H.R. 3046, 110th Cong. (2007); The Social Security
Number Protection Act, H.R. 948, 110th Cong. (2007); Stop the Theft of Our
Social Security Numbers Act, H.R. 2518, 109th Cong. (2005); Social Security
Number Privacy and Identity Theft Prevention Act, S. 2801, 108th Cong.
(2004); Social Security Number Protection Act, H.R. 4513, 107th Cong. (2002);
Social Security Number Protection Act, S. 451, 107th Cong. (2001).
246 For a comprehensive table of federal statutes and actions relating to the use
of social security numbers, see CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, supra note 7, at
15-31.
247 Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 7(A) (1), 88 Stat 1896 (1974).248 See Privacy Protection Study Commission, Personal Privacy in an
Information Society, at 612-13 (1977) ("In short, the Privacy Act and the Tax
Reform Act essentially preserved the status quo with respect to the SSN:
namely, widespread collection and use of the number.").
249 42 U.S.C. § 405(c)(2)(C)(viii)(I).
250 Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 143 (2000); see also Bloom, supra note 6,
at 49 ("[S]tate and local governments have sought to reap economic benefit from
their databases by selling them commercially.").
251 Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 300001, 108 Stat. 1796, 2099 (1994) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (1994)).
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state driver's licenses and motor vehicle registrations. 252 Another
act, the promisingly-titled "Social Security Number Confidentiality
Act," has also been signed into law but contains only the most
modest mandate that social security numbers not be visible on or
through unopened mailings of government checks. 253 Additional
protection at the federal level is provided in limited circumstances
pursuant to the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act,254 the
Fair Credit Reporting Act,255 the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996,256 the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,257 the
Freedom of Information Act,258 and others.259
Fortunately, federal agencies are improving social security
number practices even absent legislation. The Social Security
Administration, for example, truncates social security numbers on
the annual benefit statements sent to millions of Americans.260 The
Thrift Savings Plan, a retirement savings plan similar to 401(k)
plans for federal government employees, replaced the social
security number as an account identifier with an unrelated thirteen-
digit identifier. 261' The departments of Defense and Veterans
Affairs are eliminating social security numbers from employee
252 Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 2714, 118 Stat. 3638, 3832 (2004) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 405 (2004)).
253 Pub. L. No. 106-433, 114 Stat. 1910 (2000) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3327
(2000)).
254 Pub. L. No. 93-568, 88 Stat. 1858 (1974) (codified as amended at 20
U.S.C. § 1232g (1974)).
255 Pub. L. No. 90-321, 84 Stat. 1128 (1968) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 1681 (1968)).
256 Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of the U.S.C. (1996)).
257 Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 6801-6810 (1999)).
258 Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §
552 (1966)).
259 See generally PRESIDENT'S IDENTITY THEFT TASK FORCE, supra note 27, at
31-32 (discussing GLB, FCRA, HIPAA, and others); CRS REPORT FOR
CONGRESS, supra note 7, at 8 (discussing FERPA and FOIA).260 How Is Social Security Protecting Social Security Numbers?, SOCIAL
SECURITY ONLINE, http://ssa-custhelp.ssa.gov/cgi-bin/ssa.cfg/php/enduser/std_
adp.php?p faqid= 1122 (last visited June 11, 2008).
261 Frequently Asked Questions, THRIFT SAVINGS PLAN, http://www.tsp.gov/
faq/faqacctnum.html (last visited June 10, 2008).
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identification cards and health insurance cards.262 In the private
sector, financial institutions are exploring alternatives to the use of
the social security number.263
IV. PROPOSED STATUTES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Establish Laws that Internalize Current Externalities
Although courts have held that plaintiffs in data breach cases
have not suffered compensable loss, every year victims of identity
theft collectively spend an astounding 300 million hours and $5
billion reestablishing their credit history.264 Moreover, there are
considerable consequences to consumers beyond mere time and
money, including harassment from creditors, denial or loss of
employment, denial of driver's licenses and the right to vote, loss
of reputation, and even time spent in jail.265 Victims of data
breaches also lose peace of mind. Once private data is stolen there
is no period of time after which a plaintiff can rest assured that the
risk of identity theft has passed. As noted previously, social
security numbers cannot easily be changed, and patient thieves
may wait years before utilizing the information in the hope that
262 Christopher Lee, GAO: Social Security Numbers Vulnerable, WASH. POST,
Nov. 12, 2004, at A23.
263 McCall, supra note 75.
264 Identity Theft Survey Report, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Sept. 2003,
at 6, http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/synovatereport.pdf Texas State
Representative Helen Giddings, herself a victim of identity theft, claims to have
spent over 1,000 hours and $4,000 addressing the problem. Giddings, supra
note 138. The Privacy Rights Clearinghouse reports that, according to one
survey, individual victims spent an average of 175 hours trying to resolve
problems caused by identity theft, and that fewer than half were able to resolve
their case within two years. Nowhere to Turn: Victims Speak Out on Identity
Theft, May 2000, http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/idtheft2000.htm. The
legislative history of the Federal Identity Theft & Assumption Deterrence Act
included discussion of a couple that had spent over four years and $15,000
restoring their credit. Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998,
144 Cong. Rec. 24.382 (1998) (Statement of Mr. Shadegg).
265 Prepared Statement of the FTC on Identity Theft, Sept. 13, 2000, § II.A.,
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/09/idthefttest.htm.
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consumers will let their guard down or cease credit monitoring.266
These "emotional distress" losses are difficult to quantify but
clearly exist.267
Such costs are externalities that are fueled by the collection and
aggregation of data, in the sense that the data aggregator is
engaged in an activity for which someone else bears the costs.
Furthermore, the party bearing the risk of loss is separate and
distinct from the party that is in a position to reduce the risk of
loss. 268 As a consequence, the loss does not itself provide
sufficient motivation to take preventative measures.26 9 If the free
market is unable to motivate the desired result of loss mitigation or
prevention, then it is the role of the law to correct this market
failure.270
A much better approach to reducing losses stemming from data
breaches is to place the liability for such losses on the data
collectors.27' Such an allocation of liability would encourage data
collectors to weigh the benefits of data collection against the costs
flowing from potential breaches. Businesses and government
266 Cf Leibling, P.C. v. Mellon PSFS (NJ) Nat'l Assoc., 710 A.2d 1067 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1998) (holding that where defendant cashed a check over an
expired stop payment order nineteen months after issuance, plaintiff had no
cause of action against the bank that paid the instrument). See also Data
Breaches Are Frequent, supra note 34, at 29.
267 In a letter from Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez to President Bush,
Gonzalez acknowledged that identity theft "exacts a heavy . . . emotional toll
from its victims" and "that its effects can range far beyond financial harm."
PRESIDENT'S IDENTITY THEFT TASK FORCE, supra note 27, at viii-ix.
268 See Solove, supra note 23, at 1259 ("Exhortations to individuals to guard
their data place the onus on the wrong parties.").
269 See generally Levy & Stone, supra note 11 (noting that data security is lax
because "the companies charged with safeguarding the information don't suffer
the consequences when it's compromised").
270 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 75 (Harvard
University Press 1981) ("The basic function of law in an economic or wealth-
maximization perspective is to alter incentives."); NICHOLAS MERCURO &
STEVEN G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 57 (Princeton University Press
1997) ("[L]egal decision making should promote efficiency.").
271 See Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362, 370 (Minn. 1977)
(Kelly, J., dissenting) ("The loss in an accident situation should fall on the party
who can, with the minimum cost, (1) take the precautions necessary to avoid the
accident and (2) insure and spread the loss.").
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entities would likely choose to forego the collection of information
that is not truly needed for the operation of the business or whose
value to the business is marginal. 272 Employers might delay the
collection of social security numbers and other personal
information from employment applicants until after a job offer is
made or at least until after the applicant has progressed far enough
in the process to warrant a background check. Instead of using a
social security number, data collectors might choose to use a
unique identification number whose theft would not enable access
to a customer's other accounts. When data collectors decide that
sensitive personal information is truly necessary, they would be
motivated to weigh the costs of encryption and other safeguards
against the potential losses from data breach. Under a liability
regime, data collectors might restrict employee access to sensitive
personal information or may adopt data purging policies under
which data is erased after it becomes irrelevant.
Breach notification laws begin to internalize externalities by
creating the specter of erosion of both an organization's bottom
line and its reputation, thereby providing some incentive to
improve data collection and use practices. 273 The Ponemon
Institute estimates the average direct cost to a company as a result
of a data breach, in states with notice-of-breach laws, is $54 per
lost record, a figure that climbs to $182 per record when loss of
goodwill and other costs are taken into account. 274 Even so,
notification laws suffer from serious flaws. First, they are reactive
rather than proactive, since the brunt of their force is aimed at
mitigating problems after they occur. The circumstances
surrounding data breaches aptly illustrate the maxim that an ounce
of prevention is worth a pound of cure. Why subject data to
272 See Krim, supra note 61, at D5 ("[I]ndustry players have not responded
aggressively enough because they are insulated from the financial consequences
of breaches.").
273 Data Breaches Are Frequent, supra note 34, at 32 n.48.
274 Cost of a Data Breach, PONEMON INSTITUTE, Oct. 2006, at 2, http://
www.computerworld.com/pdfs/PGPAnnual_StudyPDF.pdf; Forrester
Research placed the cost even higher, at $90 to $305 per record. Sharon Gaudin,
Security Breaches Cost $90 to $305 per Lost Record, INFORMATION WEEK, Apr.
11, 2007, http://www.informationweek.com/news/security/showArticlejhtml?
articlelD=199000222.
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possible theft and misuse when such data could be collected later,
purged earlier, secured better, or not collected at all?275 Second,
because the costs to a business imposed by notification laws are
based on the occurrence of uncertain future events, these costs may
tend to be undervalued by organizations that are more concerned
with current profitability than with long term efficiency. Third, a
proliferation of breach notices for breaches of varying risk levels
could desensitize consumers and lead to unresponsiveness when a
substantial threat exists. Finally, notice of breach statutes
primarily leave to consumers the burden of dealing with the
consequences of a breach in which they played no role.
These flaws in the current notification laws provide the
motivation for enacting a federal law that allows affected
individuals to recover specified statutory damages in the event of a
data breach.276 Such a law would avoid the difficult proof and
damages problems that exist under current law and would partially
compensate breach victims for their losses.277 Statutory damages
would also benefit data collectors. By placing a fixed dollar value
on a record of data, data collectors could make rational and
quantitatively based cost-benefit decisions regarding data
collection and security practices. Clearly placing liability on data
collectors is also likely to motivate prevention efforts that reduce
losses.278 The costs of these prevention efforts will be borne
275 That information should only be collected for a "specific and legitimate
purpose" is a "standard hallmark" of data privacy practice. See Ellen
Nakashima, European Lawmaker to Sue US. Over Data, WASH. POsT, July 1,
2008, at D3, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content
/article/2008/06/30/AR2008063001895.html.
276 In the rare case in which actual damages could be proven with certainty,
the law should, and probably already does, allow for the awarding of these
damages. The proposed statutory damages statute should not change this result.
277 Congress has already endorsed statutory damages as a tool for deterring lax
data security practices potentially connected to identity theft. See 15 U.S.C. §
1681n (a) (2006); 15 U.S.C. § 1681c (g) (2006) (providing statutory damages of
$100 to $1000 plus attorneys fees and punitive damages for willful failure to
comply with certain provisions of Title 15, including a provision prohibiting the
display of more than five digits of a credit card number on receipts).
278 See Picanso, supra note 94, at 373 (2006) ("Fears of litigation could
actually play a stronger role in motivating businesses to dedicate more resources
to information security than compliance with governmental regulations.. . .").
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broadly by consumers, in contrast to the current system where the
costs of lax information collection practices are borne by those
whose private information has been compromised and especially
by those who eventually become victims of identity theft. Finally,
placing liability on data collectors allows for the free market to
produce the most efficient data collection and security practices, a
result unlikely to be achieved by statutorily enumerating specific
prohibitions or requirements.
B. Restrict Unnecessary Collection and Use of the Social Security
Number
The social security number has become so entangled with
current business practices that it may not be easy to completely
disentangle it. Imposing liability on data collectors for data
breaches will help to facilitate such disentanglement in the least
proscriptive means possible. At the same time, a few simple
minima should be established that would substantially reduce the
chances of certain types of identity theft.
First, and most importantly, a federal law should prohibit the
use of the social security number as a password.279 Such a
prohibition would prevent the use by identity thieves of a single,
unchangeable "skeleton key" to access a wide range of an
individual's accounts.280 For similar reasons, birthdays, mother's
maiden names, and other non-changeable and widely-available
data should be prohibited as passwords.28 1 Exceptions could be
made for limited activities that pose minimum risks to an account.
For example, it is desirable that an individual who loses a credit
card can cancel the card immediately rather than wait until she
279 See Lynn M. LoPucki, Did Privacy Cause Identity Theft?, 54 HASTINGS
L.J. 1277, 1279 (2003) ("[N]o one should be entitled to assume that I am you,
simply because I know your social security number.").
280 A skeleton key is a master key that will open a wide variety of locks.
Service and security personnel sometimes carry skeleton keys in order to allow
access to multiple rooms in a building without the need to carry around
hundreds of different keys.
281 See Solove, supra note 23, at 1260 ("SSNs, birth dates, and mother's
maiden names would not expose people to identity theft if this data were not
used by companies as a way to verify identity.").
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locates her password at home. The use of a social security number
as a password by an individual could be allowed for this limited
purpose, as it entails a minimal risk of loss.
Second, the display of the social security number should be
curtailed. The federal government should follow the lead of some
states by prohibiting employers, educational institutions, and
others from using the social security number as the primary means
of identification. In order to keep social security numbers out of
wallets, the display of social security numbers on most
identification cards should be prohibited. By restricting the
appearance of social security numbers on most documents sent
through the mail, the ability of identity thieves to practice their
trade by rifling through mailboxes or trash bins will be reduced.
Of course, such measures will be largely in vain if social security
numbers continue to appear in publicly available records.
Therefore, social security numbers should not be collected for most
public records; where social security numbers are required by law
or by necessity, the records should be redacted before being made
available to the public.
Third, a government body should undertake further study and
make policy changes. Understanding the impact of social security
number restrictions on business and government practices is no
simple task, and it would be reckless to advocate sweeping new
laws without understanding their impact. The FTC should
therefore be authorized to study the problem and promulgate
regulations to restrict the unnecessary collection, use, display,
transfer, and sale of the social security number. The FTC also
should be authorized to establish minimum data security and
disposal procedures to be followed when private data must be
collected or used. Furthermore, the FTC should be required to
examine the effectiveness of the various state laws already passed
in formulating its regulations. Any resulting federal laws or
regulations should supersede state laws in order to impose the
minimum possible impact on businesses and other organizations,
which would be unnecessarily burdened by varying state
requirements.
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The overarching goal should be to reduce the dissemination
and exposure of data that is linked to identity theft. Several
general principles should be more fully developed by the FTC.
First, the social security number should not be collected in all cases
where another number would suffice. This would significantly
mitigate the problem by reducing the number of points of data
vulnerability. Second, in most cases, social security numbers
should not be shared with or sold to third parties such as affiliates,
contractors, or government entities. For example, employers could
be required to establish and use secondary identification numbers
in place of the social security number when providing information
to contractors under outsourcing arrangements. These secondary
identification numbers would be unique to the organization and the
impact of their loss would therefore be limited. Third, appropriate
security measures, such as encryption, should be mandated and
should be flexible enough to accommodate varying levels of data
sensitivity and other circumstances. Finally, regulations
prescribing appropriate policies for data retention and disposal
should be developed in order to encourage the timely and proper
disposal of data once it is no longer needed. By restricting the use
of social security numbers as passwords, limiting their public
display, and promulgating flexible, nationwide regulations after
careful study, the thoughtless and damaging overuse of social
security numbers can be brought under control with minimal
impact on business.
V. CONCLUSION
In 1935, proponents of the social security system justified its
passage by arguing that, in light of the dramatic societal changes of
the time, a person "might become a victim of circumstances far
beyond his control . . . ."282 In an ironic twist, and more than
seventy years later, the social security number itself constitutes a
key factor in the uncontrollable circumstances that are annually
turning millions of consumers into identity theft victims.
282 Frances Perkins, Social Insurance for the US. (National Radio Address),
Feb. 25, 1935, available at http://www.ssa.gov/history/perkinsradio.html.
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Certainly, identity theft is a problem of prodigious
magnitude,28 3 and this article makes no attempt to comprehensively
address it. Instead, this article explains how current information
collection practices, particularly with respect to the social security
number, create an unnecessary risk of loss. Modest changes to
information collection practices and related regulations and laws
would help to reduce the incidence of certain types of identity
theft. At worst, these small changes will create a more equitable
system, aligning more closely the interests of those who collect
and use social security numbers with those whom they identify,
and reduce consumer perceptions of helplessness that result from
the control of personal information by anonymous and widely-
dispersed third parties. At best, these changes may have a
significant impact on the prevalence of identity theft. Even if this
latter goal is not achieved, the mere jurisprudential recognition of
the value of social security number privacy will promote a culture
where individuals will feel comfortable responsibly guarding their
personal information. As with preventing terrorism, three hundred
million cautious and aware individuals can do more to avoid
identity theft than the best laws or law enforcement in the world.
It is not suggested that Americans need be distrustful of either
their government or private businesses when those entities collect
data. Instead, data collecting entities are doing what rational actors
would do when faced with similar circumstances: they are
collecting data that might possibly be useful because the cost of
doing so is difficult to measure and is primarily borne by others.
While data breach notification laws increase the expenses to data
collecting entities associated with some data breaches and thereby
bring these entities' interests into greater alignment with those of
the individuals whose data is being collected, notification laws do
not fully internalize externalities nor do they address the
fundamental imbalance created when one entity holds valuable
property of another without accepting accountability for the value
of that property or for its loss or misuse. Fortunately, a number of
relatively simple reforms can appropriately place accountability on
data collecting entities and increase consumer confidence in data
283 See generally PRESIDENT'S IDENTITY THEFT TASK FORCE, supra note 27.
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collection and usage practices, all while thwarting the ever-present
and opportunistic identity thief.
